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In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the doctrine of nonobviousness, the ultimate question of patent-
ability, for the first time in thirty years. In mandating a flexible 
approach to deciding nonobviousness, the KSR opinion introduced two 
predictability standards for determining nonobviousness. The Court de-
scribed predictability of use (hereinafter termed "Type I predictabil-
ity" )-whether the inventor used the prior art in a predictable manner 
to create the invention-and predictability of the result (hereinafter 
termed "Type II predictability")-whether the invention produced a 
predictable result-both as a means for proving obviousness. 
Although Type I predictability is easily explained as part of the flexible 
approach endorsed by KSR, Type II predictability represents a poten-
tially radical shift in the nonobviousness doctrine. Instead of focusing 
on whether reasons already existed to create the invention, like Type I 
predictability does, a Type II predictability analysis takes the inven-
tion's creation as a given and examines instead the invention's opera-
tion. Type II predictability moves the analysis away from the gap 
between the prior art and the invention to the invention only. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), the Fed-
eral Circuit, and lower courts are using Type II predictability fairly 
extensively after KSR. The problem with this usage is that Type II pre-
dictability runs counter to statutory language, introduces hindsight 
bias, discriminates against certain technologies, and conflicts with ba-
sic patent theory. Accordingly, the USPTO and courts need to recon-
sider the use of Type II predictability and their interpretation of KSR. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In KSR international Co. v. Teleflex, inc., 1 the Supreme Court addressed 
the doctrine of nonobviousness, a critical question of patentability,2 for the 
first time in thirty years. 3 Most critical analyses of KSR have focused on the 
KSR Court's requirement of a flexible approach for determining a patent 
claim's nonobviousness.4 Moreover, courts and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office ("USPTO") have responded to KSR by changing their 
methodology accordingly, becoming less rigid in their approaches to deter-
mining nonobviousness.5 
I. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
2. See NoNonv1ousNESS-THE ULTIMATE C0Norr10N OF PA·mNTABILITY (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980). 
3. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
4. See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obvi-
ousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARYL. REv. 989, 991-92 (2008); Jeanne C. Fromer, The 
Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 76 (2008); Justin Lee, Note, 
How KSR Broadens (Without Lowering) the Evidentiary Standard of Nonobviousness, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 15-16 (2008). 
Others have empirically examined whether KSR lowered or raised the nonobviousness 
standard. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After ALI: 
Patent Law's Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. 
REV. 41 (2012); Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369 (2011). 
5. See, e.g., OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698, 706-
07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("The Supreme Court has warned, however, that, while an analysis of any 
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known elements is useful to an obviousness 
analysis, the overall obviousness inquiry must be expansive and flexible."). 
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Another part of the KSR decision has not received as much scholarly 
attention as the flexibility discussion,6 but is nonetheless used extensively by 
courts and the USPTO. The Supreme Court in KSR emphasized predictabil-
ity as a basis for an obviousness finding, and described two types of predict-
ability-predictability of use ("Type I"), focusing on the predictability of the 
inventor's changes to the prior art in order to create the invention7-and 
predictability of the result ("Type II"), looking at whether the invention pro-
duced predictable results.8 
Although Type I predictability does not disturb the fundamental tenets 
of nonobviousness jurisprudence, Type II predictability does. Type I predict-
ability represents another incarnation of traditional reasons used to deter-
mine nonobviousness based on a combination or change of prior art 
references.9 That is, if the invention's change to the prior art is predictable, 
reasons for the invention's creation must have existed prior to the invention, 
rendering the invention obvious. 10 Type II predictability is different, focus-
ing not on whether the invention would have been created absent the inven-
tor, 11 but taking the invention's creation as a given and looking instead at the 
invention's operation.'2 If an invention behaves in a predictable manner and, 
in turn, produces predictable results, that invention is obvious under Type II 
predictability even though there is no indication that the invention would 
have ever been created without the inventor's own insights. 
6. A very notable exception is a discussion by Rob Merges and John Duffy, recogniz-
ing that "[p]redictability is key" after KSR. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JoHN FITZGERALD 
DuFFY, PATENT LAW AND Poucv: CASES AND MATERIALS 688 (5th ed. 2011). And Rob 
Merges recognized that the general test for obviousness employs a "predictability" require-
ment as its key term. See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Paten/-
ability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. I, 2 ( 1992). As discussed infra, predictability as to use of the prior 
art, Type I predictability, fits nicely within the nonobviousness doctrine. See infra Part II.A. I. 
Predictability of results, Type II predictability, does not. See infra Part III. 
7. See KSR lnt'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (''[A] court must ask 
whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to 
their established functions."). 
8. See id. at 416 ("[T]he combination must do more than yield a predictable result."). 
9. See, e.g., Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(considering whether the invention was a "predictable solution" to a known problem). 
IO. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 ("When there is a design need or market pressure to solve 
a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordi-
nary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp."). 
11. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary lens: The 
"Suggestion Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1524-25 (noting that the 
nonobviousness doctrine implements a "but for" test-granting protection where it is needed 
to prompt invention). 
12. See, e.g., Takai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc. 632 F.3d 1358, 1378 (Fed Cir. 2011) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("The determination of obviousness is not whether a person could, 
with full knowledge of the patented device, reproduce it from prior art or known principles. 
The question is whether it would have been obvious, without knowledge of the patentee's 
achievement, to produce the same thing that the patentee produced."). 
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Type II predictability shifts the nonobviousness doctrine's focus from 
(a) looking for pre-existing reasons to cross the gap between the prior art and 
the invention to (b) the invention by itself and whether it behaves as ex-
pected. This shift in focus under Type II predictability, from the invention's 
likely creation to the expectedness of the invention's results, represents a 
fundamental change to the nonobviousness doctrine. 
This Article argues that after KSR, the USPTO and the courts actually 
use Type II predictability in their nonobviousness analysis, and sometimes 
use it exclusively. In its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP"), 13 
the USPTO instructs patent examiners that they can find a patent claim obvi-
ous if the invention's results are predictable. Moreover, the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board ("PTAB") issues opinions relying on Type II predictability for 
obviousness determinations. 14 Courts are making similar findings since 
KSR, with the Federal Circuit using Type II predictability in its nonobvious-
ness analysis, although not yet explicitly recognizing the fundamental shift it 
represents. 15 District courts are more explicit about the possible change to 
nonobviousness that Type II predictability represents. 16 A district court even 
explicitly questioned whether it is proper to instruct juries on Type II pre-
dictability and if this standard can be reconciled with established approaches 
to nonobviousness. 17 
The primary problem with Type II predictability, particularly when used 
by itself to render a patent claim obvious, is that the standard runs counter to 
patent law and patent policy. As this Article explains, the plain language of 
the governing nonobviousness statute, 35 U.S.C. § 103, rejects a Type II 
predictability analysis by requiring an evaluation of the "differences" be-
tween the prior art and the invention. 18 Type II predictability also introduces 
further hindsight bias into the analysis because of the standard's focus on the 
outcome-the invention-and lack of emphasis on the circumstances prior 
to the invention's creation. By definition, Type II predictability also biases 
13. See, e.g., MPEP (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). 
14. See, e.g., Ex Parte Smith, 83 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1509 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (using Type II pre-
dictability to find claims obvious). 
15. See, e.g., Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (finding the invention obvious because the results of the combination were predictable). 
16. See, e.g., Fujitsu, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., No. 09-C-4530, 2013 WL 4465703, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Aug., 20, 2013) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 416) ("The combination of familiar 
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than 
yield predictable results."). 
17. See, e.g., Depuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 
(D. Mass. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded on other grounds by 567 F.3d 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a jury instruction based on predictability of results as a sole basis 
for a finding of obviousness). 
18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 287 (2011) ("A 
patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained ... if the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been 
obvious ... to a person having ordinary skill in the art .... "). 
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patent protection against predictable and simple technologies even though 
patent law should encourage such technologies, 19 sometimes because of the 
very simplicity Type II predictability punishes. Finally, Type II predictabil-
ity runs counter to basic patent theory because patent law is focused on in-
centivizing would-be inventors to journey down unlikely development paths, 
not just create inventions with a specific type of result-an unpredictable 
one.20 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth the basics of modern 
nonobviousness doctrine. This Part details the Supreme Court's nonobvious-
ness jurisprudence from Graham v. John Deere to just prior to the KSR 
decision. Part II then discusses two separate important aspects of KSR: 
namely, its flexible approach to determining nonobviousness, and its discus-
sion of the post-Graham case law relating to the concept of synergy. Part II 
details how, through these discussions, KSR introduces both Type I and 
Type II predictability. Part II then describes obviousness analyses at the 
USPTO and in the courts using both types of predictability, detailing how 
recent decisions use predictability when determining nonobviousness after 
KSR. Finally, Part III explains how Type II predictability runs counter to the 
statutory language in Section 103, introduces additional hindsight bias, dis-
criminates against certain technologies, and conflicts with basic patent 
theory. 
I. THE NONOBVIOUSNESS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO KSR 
The nonobviousness requirement, "the ultimate condition for patentabil-
ity,"21 demands an invention to be more than just new and useful.22 The 
invention must be of "a significant enough technical advance to merit the 
award of a patent."23 Nonobviousness represents the highest hurdle an in-
vention must overcome to gain protection.24 
19. See Van Veen v. United States, 386 F.2d 462, 465 (1967) ("Experience has shown 
that some of the simplest advances have been the most nonobvious."); STEVEN J. PALEY, THE 
ART OF INVENTION: THE CREATIVE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY AND DESIGN (2010) (explaining 
the value of simple innovations); see also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-0-Vac Co., 
321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (simplicity of itself does not negate invention). 
20. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentabil-
ity, 120 YALE L. J. 1590, 1603-20 (2011) (describing the "inducement standard" for determin-
ing patentability). 
21. NoNOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 2. 
22. 35 U.S.C. § IOI. 
23. MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 6, at 619 ("Many patent lawyers consider nonobvi-
ousness the most important of the basic patent requirements .... This belief exists in part 
because the two other requirements of patentability are relatively mild."). 
24. See Cotropia, supra note 11, at 1525-26; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., £-Obviousness, 7 
M1cH. TEl.ECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 370 (2001); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the 
Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. EcoN. REV. I, 19 
(2004). 
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This section analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of modern nonobvi-
ousness doctrine and the substantive law that comprises the doctrine. This 
background section starts with the 1952 Patent Act25 , which marked the be-
ginning of the modern doctrine, explores the Supreme Court's decision in 
Graham v. John Deere,26 and the Supreme Court cases that follow, up to the 
Court's recent decision in KSR Int'/ Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 21 Through this dis-
cussion, the "gap measuring" aspects of the nonobviousness doctrine are in-
troduced-both measuring whether some impetus already existed to cross 
the gap between the prior art and the invention (a "reason to combine" or 
change the prior art) and whether there is a difference in result or outcome 
between the prior art and the invention (a "synergy" from the invention). 
The statutory test for nonobviousness was originally codified in 35 
U.S.C. § 103 as part of the 1952 Patent Act and changed little since.28 This 
codification, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 103 in Gra-
ham v. John Deere, form the basis for modern nonobviousness doctrine over 
the past fifty-plus years.29 Section 103 and Graham focus the theory and 
substantive law behind the nonobviousness inquiry on the difference-the 
"gap"-between what had been done and was known at the time of the in-
vention and the claimed invention itself. Under this formulation, nonobvi-
ousness asks whether a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would 
have traversed this technological gap.30 
that: 
A. Section 103, Graham, and the "Gap" 
The Section 103 statutory requirement for nonobviousness provides 
"[a] patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time 
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains."31 
The Supreme Court has expanded upon the statutory test established by 
Section 103. In Graham v. John Deere Co., the court concluded that 35 
25. Patent Act of 1952, Pub.L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792-817 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
26. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I (1965). 
27. KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The American Invents Act ("AJA"), passed in 2012, 
changed only what qualifies as "prior art" under Section 103, not the statutory test for compar-
ing the invention to the prior art. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 287 (2011 ). 
29. 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.02 (2001). 
30. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15. 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). 
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U.S.C. § I 03 mandated "several basic factual inquires" to determine a 
claimed invention's nonobviousness.32 These inquiries included: (1) identi-
fying the "scope and content of the prior art"; (2) determining the "differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims"; and (3) ascertaining "the level 
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art."33 The Supreme Court then stated that 
"[a]gainst this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject 
matter is determined."34 Secondary considerations-objective factors that in-
dicate an invention is nonobviousness-are then considered.35 
The Graham factors, like the language of Section 103 upon which they 
are based, define a "gap" and then measure that gap to determine nonobvi-
ousness.36 The gap is the difference in degree of technological progress be-
tween what has already been accomplished in a given area-the prior art-
and the invention for which patent protection is sought. The greater the 
difference in technological advancement between the prior art and the inven-
tion, the larger the gap defined by Section 103. The gap is depicted graphi-
cally in Figure I, below.37 
FIGURE l; DIFFERENCE IN TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENT 
GAP 
Prior Art Invention 
The Graham inquiry then asks whether this gap is large enough to war-
rant a patent. As the Court indicated, "[t]he emphasis on non-obviousness is 
one of inquiry, not quality, and, as such, comports with the constitutional 
strictures."38 The question is whether bridging this gap would have been 
obvious to one skilled in the art or not. 
32. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
33. Id. at 17-18. 
34. Id. 
35. See id. 
36. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness as an Exercise in Gap Measuring, in 
2 INTELL. PROP. AND INFO. WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 24-26 (Peter 
K. Yu ed., 2007) ("The magnitude of the gap ties directly into both policy goals of the nonob-
viousness requirement."). 
37. Id. at 25. 
38. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
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The Court applied this gap measuring approach to the patent in Graham, 
focusing on the "[o]bviousness of the [d]ifferences" between the prior art 
and the claimed invention.39 Graham involved a patent claim for a clamp to 
reduce vibration in a shank plow used for rocky soil and fields. 40 The differ-
ence (the gap) between what had done before and the claimed invention was 
the location of the hinge plate on the plow-with the prior art hinge below 
the pivot point of the shank while the invention's hinge was above.41 The 
patentee argued that this difference was nonobvious because placing the 
hinge plate above the pivot point allowed more flexibility in the shank, and 
thus less vibration in the plow.42 The Court concluded otherwise because, 
given the well-known problem of plow vibration, "a person having ordinary 
skill in the prior art ... would immediately see that the thing to do was what 
Graham did, i.e., invert the shank and the hinge plate."43 The gap was too 
small for a skilled artisan given that "[t]he only other effective place availa-
ble in the arrangement was to attach it below the hinge plate."44 
The Court applied a similar gap measuring analysis in cases consoli-
dated with Graham-Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co. and Colgate-
Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co. 45 In those cases, the Court concluded that 
the patented invention regarding a "hold-down" lid for a finger sprayer top 
"rests upon exceedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical differ-
ences in a device, which was old in the art."46 These differences were "ren-
dered apparent" to a skilled artisan by the prior art, meaning that the skilled 
artisan could cross the gap easily, without any need for the inventor's 
insights.47 
Over the next ten years, the Supreme Court revisited the nonobviousness 
doctrine and the Graham factors four times. In two of these cases, described 
below, the Court followed the gap measuring approach found in Section 103 
and articulated in Graham by defining the gap and determining how likely a 
skilled artisan would have crossed it at the time of the invention.48 
In United States v. Adams, the claimed invention was a wet battery that 
used water, instead of a conventional acid, and employed electrodes made of 
magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather than zinc and silver chloride.49 The 
39. Id. at 24-25. 
40. Id. at 19-21. 
41. Id. at 19-22. 
42. Id. at 21-23. 
43. Id. at 25. 
44. Id. at 24-25. 
45. Id. at 26 (consolidated with Graham). 
46. Id. at 36. 
47. Id. 
48. The other two cases, Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 
U.S. 57 (1969), and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976), introduced the synergy 
approaching to determining nonobviousness and are discussed in detail in Part LB. 
49. United States, v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). 
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Court concluded it was unlikely a skilled artisan would have made such 
changes since the workability of such a configuration as a battery was 
"wholly unexpected[ ]," "deter[ring] any investigation into such a combina-
tion."so The knowledge at the time of invention "naturally discourage[d] the 
search" for the patented invention, meaning the gap was unlikely to be 
crossed by a skilled artisan.s 1 
In contrast, the Court found the invention in Dann v. Johnson obvious 
because "[t]he gap between the prior art and [the invented] system is simply 
not so great as to render the system nonobvious to one reasonably skilled in 
the art."52 The invention in Johnson was an automated category-coded finan-
cial transaction system, in which a user could code her checks and deposits 
to particular categories such as rent, food, or fuel.53 The Court determined 
that giving a customer sub-accounts, essentially categorizing transactions, 
was well known and that automating such a system was not sufficiently dif-
ferent. s4 Automation of a new system would have been obvious because of 
the already "extensive use of data processing systems in the banking indus-
try" at the time of the invention. 55 That is, the gap was not large enough to 
warrant patent protection. 
B. Synergism-Another Method of Gap Measuring 
The two Supreme Court cases sandwiched between Adams and Dann-
namely, Anderson's Black-Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. and Saikraida 
v. Ag. Pro, Inc.-articulated a specific rule for determining the nonobvious-
ness of combination inventions-a requirement for "synergism" for the re-
sulting invention to be patentable.56 As the Court articulated, synergism 
requires that the combination of prior art elements result "in an effect greater 
than the sum of the several effects taken separately."s7 
In the first case after Graham, Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement 
Salvage Co., the Court introduced the synergism rule while finding the as-
serted patent obvious.s8 The invention in Anderson's-Black Rock combined a 
radiant-heat burner with a paving machine.s9 The Court found the invention 
unpatentable because both the prior art radiant-heat burner and other por-
tions of the paving machine, when combined, performed the same function 
50. Id. at 51-52. 
51. Id. at 52. 
52. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976). 
53. ld.at221-22. 
54. Id. at 226-27. 
55. Id. at 227-30. 
56. See Kevin J. Lake, Synergism and Nonobviousness: The Rhetorical Rubik's Cube of 
Patentability, 24 B.C. L. REV. 697, 713-16 (1983) (describing Anderson's-Black Rock and 
Adams usage of synergy). 
57. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969). 
58. Id. at 60-63. 
59. Id. at 58. 
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as they did individually.60 Their combination "did not produce a 'new or 
different function."'61 Combining these known elements "add[ed] nothing to 
the nature and quality" of the individual components.62 That is, there was no 
synergy in the combination. 
The Court's next nonobviousness decision, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 
took the same synergy approach to determining nonobviousness.63 The pat-
ent in Sakraida concerned a dairy cow barn configured with sloped floors, 
drains, and water storage tanks in order to make waste cleanup simpler.64 
The Court concluded that this combination could not "properly be character-
ized as synergistic."65 The individual prior art elements operated in the same 
way when combined and produced the same results. And "[a] patent for a 
combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respec-
tive functions ... obviously withdraws what already is known into the field 
of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful 
men .... "66 Accordingly, the Jack of synergy-the Jack of a new or different 
result from the combination-rendered the invention obvious. 
In Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida, the Court did not focus on the 
likelihood of the gap being overcome by a skilled artisan; rather, it consid-
ered the technical effect of the invention in comparison to the prior art.67 
Does the combination do more-produce new or different results-than 
what each individual prior art element did on its own before? If not, the 
combination is not patentable because of a Jack of synergy. 
Synergy focuses on a gap-the gap between the results in the prior art 
and those of the invention. An invention lacks synergy if that gap is too 
small or essentially non-existent. Synergism does not focus on the path taken 
from the prior art to the invention and whether this path is unlikely to be 
traveled by the skilled artisan. Instead, synergism involves a comparison of 
operation-operation of the prior art by itself compared to the prior art when 
combined.68 Whether such a combination would ever come about absent the 
inventor's insights appears to be irrelevant under this standard.69 Instead, 
60. Id. at 60. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 62. 
63. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976). 
64. Id. at 275-77. 
65. Id. at 282. 
66. Id. at 281 (quoting Great A.&. P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 153 (1950)). 
67. Id. at 281-82; CHISUM, supra note 29, § 5.02[5][e]. 
68. See Tamir Packin, Note, A New Test for Obviousness in Combination Patents: Eco-
nomic Synergy, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 957, 960 (2006) ("The Supreme Court developed the 
first approach, known as the 'synergy test,' which requires that the known elements, when 
combined, must function in a synergistic way, where the function of the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts."). 
69. When compared to the typical approach to nonobviousness (reason to combine or 
change), synergy's different approach has drawn criticism. "The Supreme Court's synergy test 
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synergy is about technical effect; more precisely, it is about the gap of tech-
nical effect between the prior art and the invention. 
Thus, prior to the KSR decision, synergy as a nonobviousness standard 
was similar to the Graham factors approach. Both defined a gap between the 
prior art and the invention. However, this gap is either the amount of change 
needed in the prior art to create the invention (the Graham approach70), or 
the difference in the results achieved by using the prior art versus using the 
invention (synergy).7 1 
II. KSR's "PREDICTABILITY" AS A CHANGE To THE 
NONOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD 
This part examines the Supreme Court's most recent decision on nonob-
viousness, KSR, its emphasis on predictability, and the subsequent use of 
predictability by the USPTO and courts. This examination starts with the 
KSR decision itself, explaining the decision's introduction of two distinct 
types of predictability. This part then looks at administrative decisions by 
the USPTO and court decisions by both the Federal Circuit and district 
courts. Opinions by all of these patent decision-makers are examined to de-
termine how they use the predictability analysis introduced by KSR and the 
conclusions on nonobviousness produced by this usage. 
The following analysis ultimately shows that KSR has introduced, and 
the USPTO and courts have adopted, two concepts of predictability into the 
law of nonobviousness: predictability as to use ("Type I'' predictability) and 
predictability as to results ("Type II" predictability). The former turns out to 
be just another reason for a skilled artisan to combine the prior art and sup-
ports a conclusion that the gap is not large enough to justify patent protec-
tion. The latter, in contrast, is a true substantive change to nonobviousness 
by refocusing the inquiry on the invention by itself instead of the difference 
between the invention and the prior art. These two types of predictability, 
may be too severe: synergy may sometimes be an indication that a combination invention is 
non-obvious, but it seems likely that a combination may sometimes be non-obvious without 
bringing a synergy." John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 503 (2003) (critiquing 
the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness requirement at the time for other shortcomings). The 
Federal Circuit has even dismissed synergism as a requirement for determining nonobvious-
ness. See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding a jury instruction on synergy erroneous); see also Robert Desmond, 
Comment, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The 
Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms the Standard of Obviousness 
Under Patent Law, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 455, 456 (1993) ("Through its decisions over the last 
ten years, the [court] has dramatically reinterpreted the standard of obviousness. Certain pat-
ents that would have been invalid because they were obvious under the Supreme Court's stan-
dard have been construed as valid under the [court's] new standard of obviousness."). 
70. See Cotropia, supra note 36, at 24-26. 
71. See Packin, supra note 68, at 960. 
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and their appearance in post-KSR nonobviousness decisions and fundamen-
tal impact on the nonobviousness doctrine, are explored further below. 
A. Two Types of "Predictability" in KSR 
In 2006, the Supreme Court reconsidered the nonobviousness doctrine 
in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 72 The Court reviewed whether the 
Federal Circuit's exclusive use of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
("TSM") test to determine the nonobviousness of inventions, such as 
Teleflex's combination of a adjustable automobile throttle pedal with elec-
tronic sensors, was proper.73 The Court also addressed the continued viabil-
ity of Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida and synergy as a 
nonobviousness test. 74 
The Court in KSR invoked the concept of predictability multiple times 
when discussing the nonobviousness doctrine. These invocations fall into 
two basic categories: predictability as to use and predictability as to results. 
Predictability of use was discussed in the context of making the nonobvious-
ness inquiry more flexible and beyond the TSM test. The predictability of 
result approach was introduced in the Court's discussion of the synergy 
cases-Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida. 
1. Predictable Use ("Type I" Predictability) 
One fundamental decision of the Court in KSR was its rejection of the 
TSM test as the exclusive test for determining nonobviousness.75 The Court, 
in turn, introduced a variety of gap measuring tools to determine whether an 
invention is nonobvious, one of which is the predictability of the prior art's 
use-what is referred to in this Article as "Type I" predictability.76 
Such gap measuring tools introduced in KSR vary, but all have the same 
common goal-determining whether the gap between the prior art and the 
invention is large enough for the invention to warrant patent protection. For 
example, the Court noted that the inherent traits of a person having ordinary 
skill in the art could provide reasons to combine or change the prior art and 
render the invention obviousness.77 Ordinary creativity of the skilled artisan 
should also be considered to determine nonobviousness.78 The Court focused 
on externalities indicating that the gap between the prior art and the claimed 
72. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
73. Id. at 407. 
74. Id. at 416-18. 
75. Id. at 415. 
76. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 29, § 5.02. 
77. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21 ("Common sense teaches ... that familiar items may have 
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will 
be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle."). 
78. Id. at 418 (Courts should "take account of the inferences and creative steps that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."). 
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invention was small, and that the invention, therefore, was obvious.79 There 
are also instances where "the fact that a combination was obvious to try 
might show that it was obvious under § 103."80 Accordingly, the Court 
found that"[ w ]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a prob-
lem and there are a finite number of identified solutions, a person of ordi-
nary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her 
technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product 
not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense."81 
At the heart of this discussion of various factors was the Court's reaf-
firmance of the Graham approach and the requirement that the nonobvious-
ness analysis stay functional and flexible. 82 As the Court put it, "it can be 
important" to identify a reason to combine the prior art.83 
In this discussion of flexibility in determining nonobviousness, the 
Court referenced predictability. Predictability measures the likelihood that a 
person of ordinary skill would combine or change elements of the prior art to 
make the invention. "[A] court must ask whether the improvement is more 
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established 
functions."84 In turn, if there is a "predictable solution" to a given problem, 
"a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options 
within his or her technical grasp."85 That is, the more predictable it is to use 
the prior art to make the invention, the more likely there was already a rea-
son at the time of the invention for those of ordinary skill to make the neces-
sary changes. 
This type of predictability, Type I predictability, focuses on the likeli-
hood a combination or change to the prior art would have happened and, 
thus, cross the gap, absent the inventor's actions. Taking the state of the art 
at the time of invention, Type I predictability questions how likely-how 
predictable-it would be to cross the difference and come up with the inven-
tion. The greater the Type I predictability, the smaller the gap-or, put an-
other way, the higher the likelihood that the gap would have been crossed 
without the inventor's insight.86 
Thus, Type I predictability is simply another analytical tool introduced 
by the Court in KSR to make the nonobviousness inquiry more flexible.87 
79. Id. ("[D)emands known to the design community or present in the marketplace" can 
provide a reason to change the prior art in order to practice the invention can be found). 
80. Id. at 421. 
81. Id. While discussed in more detail infra, the term predictability entered this conver-
sation as well. 
82. Id. at 418-22. 
83. Id. at 418. 
84. ld.at417. 
85. Id. at 421. 
86. See supra Part I.A. 
87. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 76. In fact, Type I predictability is very similar to 
Merges' articulation of nonobviousness as using an uncertainty standard for patentability. 
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The ultimate substantive inquiry does not change-the decision maker is 
still focused on whether the technological gap is large enough to warrant 
patent protection. Type I predictability is just another data point to help de-
cide whether a skilled artisan would have made that jump without the inven-
tor's assistance. 88 
2. Predictable Result ("Type II" Predictability) 
The Court in KSR also discussed predictability in a different way by 
focusing not on whether the combination or change is predictable (Type I 
predictability), but on whether the behavior of the resulting combination or 
change is predictable (Type II predictability). That is, the Court discussed 
obviousness in situations where the ultimate invention "yield[s] predictable 
results," not whether the creation of the invention itself is predictable.89 This 
introduction of Type II predictability occurred when the Court revisited the 
synergy cases. 
The KSR Court reaffirmed and further explained its holdings in Ander-
son's-Black Rock and Sakraida by noting that "[n]either the enactment of 
§ 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court's earlier instructions 
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combina-
tion of elements found in the prior art."90 The Court focused on the princi-
ples underlying decisions such as Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida for 
determining the patentability of a claim for a combination of elements of the 
prior art.91 
However, the discussion did not focus specifically on the concept of 
synergism described in these earlier opinions, but instead on the concept of 
predictability. The KSR Court described Adams, Anderson's-Black Rock, and 
Sakraida as evaluating the predictability of the invention's results.92 For 
cases where the Court found the inventions to be obvious, the Court pointed 
out that the combined elements operated as expected.93 For Anderson's-
Black Rock, the Court explained that "[t]he radiant-heat burner functioned 
Robert Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 H1GH TECH. L.J. I, 2-4 
( 1992). Merges articulates the nonobviousness standard as "serv[ing] a gatekeeping function; 
it seeks to reward inventions that, viewed prospectively, have a low probability of success." 
Id. at 2. ''The nonobviousness standard encourages researchers to pursue projects whose suc-
cess appears highly uncertain at the outset. The standard insists that only the results from 
uncertain research should be rewarded with a patent." Id. 
88. See, e.g., Marian Underweiser, Presumed Obvious: How KSR Redefines the Obvi-
ousness Inquiry to Help Improve the Public Record of a Patent, 50 IDEA 247, 268-274 (2010) 
(explaining how KSR's requirement to show a "reason to combine" includes "predictable" 
combinations). 
89. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. 
90. Id. at 415-16. 
91. Id. at 416-17; see also MERGES & DUFPY, supra note 6, at 688 (noting this part of 
the KSR opinion). 
92. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415-18. 
93. Id. 
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just as a burner was expected to function; and the paving machine the same. 
The two in combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential 
operation."94 For Sakraida, the Court noted that the combination "yields no 
more than one would expect from such an arrangement."95 In contrast, the 
Court reasoned that the invention in Adams was nonobvious because the 
"elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner."96 The 
Court explained that these synergism opinions focused on the predictability 
of the invention's ultimate behavior, not on whether creating the invention 
was predictable.97 
Other scholars have noted this discussion of predictability in the context 
of synergy. For example, Duffy and Merges explicitly recognize this recast-
ing of synergism by the Court in KSR.98 They view the Court's re-explana-
tion of synergy as shifting the nonobviousness inquiry to predictability.99 
Type II predictability-predictability as to results-focuses on the in-
vention itself instead of the gap between the prior art and the invention. The 
inquiry asks whether the invention, once it is created, acts in a predictable 
manner. Does it operate how a skilled artisan would believe it would when 
the prior art elements are changed or combined? The difference between the 
prior art and the invention-the gap-is irrelevant in a Type II predictability 
analysis. 
The introduction of Type II predictability presents a different approach 
to determining nonobviousness. The Court's focus in KSR on predictable 
results moves the inquiry away from the gap and from how easy is it for a 
skilled artisan to traverse the gap to instead focus solely on the invention and 
the interaction of the given elements of the invention itself. 
One could argue that there is some linkage between the predictability of 
the operation of the invention and the magnitude of the gap. If the inven-
tion's elements work together in an unpredictable way, that fact provides 
some second-order evidence that the path to get there is unpredictable, and 
unlikely to be traveled. 100 Skilled artisans are likely to avoid creating things 
for which the operation is uncertain. This reasoning is the foundation for a 
94. Id. at 416-17. 
95. Id. at 417. 
96. Id. at 416. 
97. Nor did the court look at it through traditional synergism lens-measuring the dif-
ference in results of the prior art elements and the invention. See supra Part J.B. (explaining 
the traditional synergy approach). 
98. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 6, at 688. 
99. Id. (noting that "[p]redictability is key" after KSR). 
100. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) ("If a patent challenger makes a prima facie showing of obviousness, the 
owner may rebut based on 'unexpected results' by demonstrating 'that the claimed invention 
exhibits some superior property or advantage that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art 
would have found surprising or unexpected.'") (quoting In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995)). 
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rebuttal to a primafacie case of obviousness that existed well before KSR-
unexpected results. 101 The Federal Circuit has long recognized that even if 
there is some reason to combine the prior art to make the invention, if the 
results are unexpected, then this provides good objective evidence that a 
skilled artisan is unlikely to act on a possible reason to combine or change 
the prior art. 102 Such unexpected results rebut the prima facie case of 
obviousness. 103 
But the lack of predictable results is not conclusive of the likelihood that 
the invention would not have been made by a skilled artisan. Scientists com-
monly perform experiments in technical areas where they know, and are 
comfortable with the fact, that the exact result is not predictable. Quantum 
theory, for example, is rooted in unpredictability and uncertainty, 104 yet it is 
used extensively within physics and mechanical engineering as well other 
areas of science and technology such as computer design and biology. Even 
though the results of such application may be unpredictable, the usage of 
quantum theory is extensive and not, by definition, nonobvious in every situ-
ation.105 For these types of applications and industries, the combinations 
happen all the time, even though the exact results are not necessarily 
known. 106 
Moreover, the use of Type II predictability to prove obviousness 
presents a very different situation than looking at unexpected results. Prior to 
KSR, unpredictable results were used to disprove a case of obviousness, and 
101. See, e.g., In re Margolis, 785 F.2d 1029, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re De Blauwe, 
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering whether the patentee established unexpected 
results to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness). 
102. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1575-76 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding an unexpected result and concluding that the invention was 
nonobvious). 
103. See In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("When a prima facie case 
of obviousness is made, the burden then shifts to the applicant to come forward with evidence 
and/or argument supporting patentability."); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 
802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Objective evidence such as commercial success, fail-
ure of others, long-felt need, and unexpected results must be considered before a conclusion on 
obviousness is reached and is not merely 'icing on the cake,' as the district court stated at 
trial."). 
104. See HALLIDAY ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS (8th Ed. 2008); GERARD J. MIL-
BURN, ScHRODINGER's MACHINES: THE QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY RESHAPING EVERYDAY LIFE 
iv-viii, xv-xvi (1997) ("Today, we are surrounded by technology that owes its existence, di-
rectly or indirectly, to the application of quantum mechanical process"); THE UNCERTAINTY 
PRINCIPLE AND FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS (William c. Price & Seymour s. 
Chissick eds.,1977) (explaining the uncertainty principles and its now common application in 
physics); Philip Ball, The Dawn of Quantum Biology, 474 NATURE 272 (2011) (describing the 
quantum effects in living organisms and their impact on creating quantum technologies). 
105. See THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE AND FOUNDATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS, 
supra note 104. 
106. Id. 
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they are still used for this purpose. 107 After KSR, however, predictable re-
sults can now be used to deny patentability. 
This switch in using predictability of results to establish the primafacie 
obviousness case magnifies Type II predictability's inability to provide in-
sight into the size of the gap. The predictability of an interaction between 
prior art elements tells patent law little about whether an invention would 
have been made without the inventor's insights. There are conceivably many 
inventions that have yet to be attempted, or even envisioned, that once con-
ceived, will yield predictable results. Therefore, just because an invention's 
results are predictable does not mean that the invention's creation is also 
likely. 
For example, Post-It Notes exemplify predictable results of an unlikely 
combination. Post-It Notes are a combination of two known elements in the 
prior art-a piece of paper and a semi-adhesive substance. 108 Once they are 
combined, the results are very predictable-a piece of paper that lightly 
sticks. 109 The ingenuity-the nonobviousness-of this invention is in com-
ing up with the combination in the first place. 110 The same could be said for 
something like liquid paper-a very predictably-behaving combination 
whose path to creation and use was highly unlikely .111 
This predictable results standard is different from synergy. Anderson's-
Black Rock and Sakraida originally articulated the concept of "synergism" 
as two elements that, when combined, interacted in such a way to produce a 
result that neither element could produce on its own. 112 Put simply, synergy 
is when "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts." 113 Synergy speaks 
to the differences between the prior art and the invention not with regard to 
the path of development but the difference in results. Synergism is still a 
comparative standard-it measures a difference. A synergistic invention 
provides a result that is greater than the result from each piece of prior art 
107. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Phanns. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 997 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing the unexpected results secondary consideration that can negate a 
prima facie case of obviousness). 
108. See Jom. LEVY, REALLY USEFUL: THE ORIGINS OF EVERYDAY THINGS 142-43 (Anna 
Bennett ed., 2002) (describing the invention of Post-It Notes). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 6; see also JoHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION (1969) 71 ("In-
ventions in one field have lain donnant until some ingenious inventor has seized the old idea, 
combined it with a notion gleaned from another apparently unrelated field and produced a new 
and fruitful combination."). 
111. See ETHLIE ANN VARE & GREG PTACEK, PATENTLY FEMAI.E: FROM AZT TO TV 
DINNERS, STORIES OF WOMEN INVENTORS AND THEIR BREAKTHROUGH IDEAS 13-15 (2002) 
(describing the invention of liquid paper- a correction fluid for covering typing mistakes that 
was made with tempera paint and a common kitchen blender). 
I 12. See Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281-92 (1976); Anderson's-Black 
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-63 (1969). 
113. Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 281-92; Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 60-63. 
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acting by itself, and thus the "results" gap between the prior art and the 
invention is considered large enough to warrant patent protection. 114 
In contrast, the same is not true for Type II predictability because not all 
predictable results lack synergy and vice versa. For example, a simple chem-
ical reaction can evidence a lot of synergy, but be incredibly predictable. 
The combination of baking soda and vinegar is commonly used to create the 
classic children's erupting volcano science fair project. 115 Combining these 
produces a synergy-a result that behaves very differently then the individ-
ual elements themselves. Only when combination is made does the bubbling 
and expansion take place. Yet this result is incredibly predictable, with chil-
dren reproducing this reaction every school year. 116 
Unpredictable results are likewise not necessarily synergistic. The un-
predicted result may be that there is no interaction, such as with a failed 
chemical reaction with each chemical simply staying, and thus behaving, the 
same after their combination. 117 This result could be unpredictable to a 
skilled artisan who believes that a reaction would occur, even though the 
reaction lacks any synergy-no new result is produced. 118 
Therefore, Type II predictability encompasses a very different standard 
to determine nonobviousness than looking for reasons to change or combine 
or even synergy. The standard shifts from measuring the invention's techno-
logical advance over the prior art-the width and/or likely crossing of the 
gap-to valuing the uncertainty of the final invention by itself. 
B. Predictability in the USPTO and Courts after KSR 
Thus, there are two types of predictability introduced by KSR that the 
USPTO and federal courts can use in determining nonobviousness. The 
question is whether they are using Type I predictability-the "predictable 
use" type-and simply making the reason to change or combine analysis 
more flexible, or whether they are actually using Type II predictability-the 
"predictable results" type-and substantively changing the nonobviousness 
standard. Examining nonobviousness determinations by both the USPTO 
and the courts helps quantify the impact of KSR's predictability discussion 
and determine whether Type II predictability is actually being used. 
Accordingly, this Part examines all levels of the patent adjudication sys-
tem. The discussion starts with the USPTO, which makes an initial determi-
114. See Packin, supra note 68, at 960. 
115. NEIL ARDLEY, 101 GREAT SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS 11 (Jenny Vaughan & Steve 
Setford eds., 2006) (detailing the "Make a volcano erupt" experiment's combination of vinegar 
and sodium bicarbonate to make "red-hot lava"). 
116. Id. 
117. This was the case with the initial discover of noble gases that are inert and do not 
react. See Edward Renouf, Review: Lehrbuch der anorganischen Chemie by H. Erdmann, 13 
SCIENCE 268, 268-69 (1901). 
118. This would definitely have been the case upon the first discovery of noble gases. Id. 
Spring 2014] Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law 409 
nation as to whether a patent meets the nonobviousness requirement or not, 
and then considers the courts, which handle the enforcement of patents and 
make their own determinations regarding nonobviousness. 119 
Based on the USPTO's and federal courts' application of KSR, it ap-
pears that both types of predictability are being used in patent decisions. 
More relevantly, when Type II predictability is used, the analysis focuses on 
a substantially different measurement of patentability-the invention's result 
by itself and not the extent of the difference between the prior art and the 
invention as was traditionally the case before KSR. 
I. USPTO's Usage of Predictability after KSR 
At the USPTO, obviousness determinations are made both by patent ex-
aminers, who review patent applications for patent eligibility, 120 and admin-
istrative law judges on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PT AB"), who 
review appeals of rejected patent applications and handle ex parte and inter 
partes reexamination proceedings. 121 
However, practical limitations make it difficult to observe individual ex-
aminer decisions made during patent prosecution. The sheer number and 
lack of efficient search mechanisms of these individual decisions, which 
come in the form of "office actions," make investigations at this level infea-
sible, particularly in any systematic and extensive fashion. 122 
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") provides insight 
into how individual examiners, and the USPTO as a whole, interpret and use 
KSR and the concept of predictability. USPTO personnel draft the MPEP as 
a guide for patent examiners to USPTO procedure and examination. 123 Chap-
ter 2100 of the MPEP explains the proper grounds for rejecting applications, 
including for obviousness. 124 And, while the MPEP does not legally bind 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012) (establishing the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdic-
tion over such cases). 
120. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)-(b) (2012). 
121. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 313 (2011) (de-
tailing the decisions the PTAB reviews). 
122. But see Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?, 42 
RES. P01.'v 844, 844 (2013) (randomly sampling 1000 patent prosecution histories to deter-
mine the usage of applicant-submitted prior art by patent examiners). 
However, a brief search of USPTO nonobviousness rejections immediately turned up a 
Type II predictability based rejection. See, e.g., Office Action Summary, U.S. Patent Applica-
tion No. 11/228,647 at 8 (July 16, 2010), available at http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/view/Browse 
PdfServlet?objectld=GBMTJEl6PPOPPY5&1ang=DINO ("It would have been a simple sub-
stitution of parts that would have been obvious to one o[sic] ordinary skill in the art as it would 
have provided the same predictable results."). 
123. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Patlex 
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("The MPEP states that it is a 
reference work on patent practices and procedures and does not have the force of law, but it 
'has been held to describe procedures on which the public can rely."')). 
124. MPEP, supra note 13, § 2141. 
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examiner actions, patent examiner behavior should, and likely does, fall in 
line with its guidance. 125 
Additionally, PTAB decisions control USPTO decisions and are thus 
another source in determining the Office's interpretation and usage of 
KSR. 126 These PTAB decisions likely have a broader impact on examining 
procedure than do individual examiner determinations. Some PTAB deci-
sions are marked precedential and explicitly control examiner activity in all 
examinations. 127 The other, non-precedential decisions, while only control-
ling examiner action in that specific patent application, are still of higher 
profile than individual examiner actions. Thus, an examiner is likely to fol-
low a nonprecedential decision outside of the context of the decision's spe-
cific patent claims and examiner action. 
Both of these sources-the MPEP and PT AB decisions-demonstrate 
usage of both types of predictability. They are explored in detail below. 
a. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
The last version of the MPEP issued prior to KSR, the 8th Edition, Revi-
sion 5, made only two mentions of predictability in its discussion of 35 
U.S.C. § 103. 128 Both of these discussions focused on the lack of predictabil-
ity as an indicator of nonobviousness. Unpredictability as an indicator of 
nonobviousness is opposite from predictability as set forth in KSR, where 
predictability is an indicator of obviousness. 
The first discussion of predictability in the pre-KSR version of the 
MPEP, Section 2143.02, discussed predictability in the context of "Reasona-
ble Expectation of Success," where the lack of predictability is a secondary 
consideration of nonobviousness. 129 Section 2143.02 instructed examiners 
that obviousness findings require a reasonable expectation of success. 130 
Without "some degree of predictability" as to how the invention will oper-
ate, there cannot be a finding of obviousness. 131 The discussion focused on 
cases involving various chemical and biological technologies where the in-
teraction of the prior art is difficult to predict, and thus such interactions are 
nonobvious. 132 As discussed above, this was the typical usage of predictabil-
125. Examination Guidelines Update: Development in the Obviousness Inquiry After 
KSR v. Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,644 (Sept. 1, 2010). 
126. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 7, § 6(b), 125 Stat. 313 
(2011 ); Michael Fleming, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences Standard Operating Pro-
cedure 2 (Revision 7) Publication of Opinions and Binding Precedent, USPTO (Mar. 23, 
2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop2.pdf. Precedential PT AB decisions 
are available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/prec/. 
127. Fleming, supra note 126. 
128. MPEP, supra note 13, § 2143. 
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ity prior to the KSR decision-as a secondary consideration proving 
nonobviousness. 133 
Predictability was also discussed in the pre-KSR version of the MPEP in 
the context of "Obviousness of Species When Prior Art Teaches Genus," in 
Section 2144.08. 134 In this section, just as with the previous section, predict-
ability was used to negate a finding of obviousness. Examiners were in-
structed to use predictability in one particular situation-when the prior art 
discloses a genus and the invention is a species of that genus. 135 As MPEP 
§ 2144.08 explained, "[i]f the technology is unpredictable, it is less likely 
that structurally similar species will render a claimed species obvious be-
cause it may not be reasonable to infer that they would share similar proper-
ties."136 Here, again, the MPEP's use of predictability mirrors the secondary 
considerations' unexpected results inquiry-as a rebuttal to determinations 
of obviousness. 137 
In sharp contrast, after KSR, later editions of the MPEP-Revision 6, 
and all subsequent revisions 138-make heavy use of the concept of predict-
ability as an indicator of obviousness-no longer limiting it to rebutting a 
prima facie case of obviousness. 139 In Section 2141, the MPEP now de-
scribes predictability in both of the ways the Supreme Court utilizes the 
concept-both as a reason to combine or change the prior art, Type I, and as 
an independent rationale for obviousness, Type II. 
The MPEP instructs examiners that the predictability of the combina-
tion-the likelihood that the prior art would have been combined at the time 
of the invention-can be a rationale to support a finding of obviousness. 140 
This is the Type I strain of predictability discussed in KSR. The MPEP re-
cites two specific rationales that apply predictability in this way: 
(E) "Obvious to try"-choosing from a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success; 
(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of 
it for use in either the same field or a different one based on 
design incentives or other market forces if the variations are 
predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art. 141 
Both of these reasons to combine the prior art consider, at least in part, 
whether a skilled artisan could have predicted the combination, not the re-
133. See supra notes I 00-103. 
134. MPEP, supra note 13, § 2144.08. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. See supra notes 100-103. 
138. The relevant sections remain the same in the latest revision of the MPEP. 
139. MPEP, supra note 13, § 2141. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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suit. Under "obvious to try," the focus is on whether the resulting combina-
tion-the creation of the solution-is predictable. 142 The second rationale 
has the same focus-whether the "variation[ ]"-the invention-is predict-
able in light of the prior art. 143 These rationales focus on how large the gap 
is between the prior art and the invention. In turn, these rationales ask how 
likely and how easily an inventor would cross the gap. These predictability 
rationales fall within the Court's request to make the nonobviousness deter-
mination process flexible by considering all evidence that goes towards mea-
suring the gap. 144 
In the same section, the MPEP also instructs examiners to use predict-
ability in the other way discussed in KSR-predictability as to results, or 
Type II predictability. Three of the rationales for obviousness ask the exam-
iner to evaluate whether the invention produces predictable results, not 
whether the invention's creation itself was predictable. 145 These rationales 
are: 
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to 
yield predictable results; 
(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain 
predictable results. 
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or 
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results. 146 
As explained by the MPEP, there needs to be no finding that a skilled 
artisan would have combined the prior art in the same way as the inven-
tion.147 Instead, there simply needs to be a finding that they could have made 
the combination and that its results would have been predictable. 148 This line 
of analysis-focusing on the predictability of the invention's results, not of 
the prior art's combination-accords with KSR's Type Il predictability anal-
ysis.149 This discussion also highlights the substantive shift Type II predict-
ability introduces-a shift away from focusing on the technological 
142. See, e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA L.L.C., 683 F.3d 1356, 
1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR Int'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)) 
("Under these circumstances, it is fair to say that there were 'a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions' to the problem of finding physiological cooling agents for chewing gum 
. . . . This case is thus one in which a person of ordinary skill in the art would find it 'obvious 
to try' the combination recited in claim 34."). 
143. See MPEP, supra note 13, § 2141. 
144. See supra Part II.A. I. 
145. See MPEP, supra note 13, § 2141. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. § 2143. 
149. See supra Part 11.A.2. 
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advancement from the prior art to the invention to the behavior of the inven-
tion itself. 150 
b. Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
Similar to the changes in the MPEP, the PTAB has also changed its use 
of predictability in nonobviousness decisions after KSR. 
Prior to KSR, the PTAB did not commonly use predictability terminol-
ogy in its nonobviousness decisions. I searched PT AB decisions to deter-
mine the frequency of use of the term "predictable" (and its variations) in 
nonobviousness decisions. 151 Prior to KSR, 152 110 of the 8183 nonobvious-
ness decisions used the phrase "predictable" or some variation thereof. 153 
Fifty-two of these used the phrase "predictable results" or some derivation. 
And, during the pre-KSR period, there were no precedential decisions that 
focused on using predictability in determining nonobviousness. 
In comparison, after KSR, the PTAB's use of the predictability terminol-
ogy is quite common. As of August 27, 2012, 6455 of 31,414 nonobvious-
ness decisions invoked the term. 154 More than three fourths, 4954 cases, used 
the phrase "predictable results" or some derivation. This is a change from 
1.3% to 20.5% of the nonobviousness determinations that invoked the term 
"predictability" and a change from 0.6% to 15.8% in use of the phrase "pre-
dictable results." These are statistically significant differences and provide 
further evidence that the USPTO views KSR as interjecting a new predict-
ability standard into the nonobviousness analysis-specifically Type II 
predi ctabi Ii ty. 155 
This change is confirmed when looking at some of the post-KSR PTAB 
opinions in depth, which is done in detail below. The post-KSR PTAB opin-
ions use both types of predictability presented in KSR. 
Many PTAB opinions use Type I predictability-predictability as evi-
dence of a reason to combine or change. As one recent example, in Ex Parte 
150. See MPEP, supra note 13, § 2141 (showing that the focus is on the results, not the 
act of combining). 
151. The Westlaw database FIP-PTO was searched. This database, whose full name is 
Federal Intellectual Property - Patent & Trademark Office Decisions, begins its coverage in 
January of 1987. The database is therefore not complete, but does include administrative deci-
sion prepared by the PTAB. Again, this is of the universe of PTAB decisions available on 
Westlaw. 
152. The specific search was from 1987, the beginning of the FIP-PTO database, to the 
date of the KSR decision-an over twenty year period. 
153. Again, this finding derives from the universe of PTAB decisions available on 
Westlaw. The variations found included phrases such as "predictable result" or "predictable 
outcome." 
154. The larger differential in the number of PTAB nonobviousness decisions over this 
five year period as compared to the pre-KSR, twenty year period is likely due to the recent 
exponential increase in pending patent applications and rate of appeal to the PTAB. 
155. This difference is statistically significant, with a p-value < .000 I. 
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Tzang In Yeh, 156 the PT AB reviewed the obviousness of a "slider"-"a de-
vice suitable for sliding on various surfaces such as a bodyboard, a 
snowboard, a snow sled, a grass sliding board, sand sliding board, or the 
like."157 The patent claimed a slider where the top layer is "entirely heat 
laminated" to the top of a "foam core." 158 The invention also required that 
the top surface of the slider have a "plurality of concaves forming 
depressions." 159 
The PTAB focused on whether the invention was a "predictable varia-
tion" of the prior art. 160 Relying on KSR to establish the legal standard, the 
PTAB inquired whether the top layer's construction "would not have been 
merely a predictable variation, especially considering [the prior art's] nu-
merous teachings as to the desirability of covering the surfaces of the board 
as to prevent water absorption .... " 161 This analysis focused on the predict-
ability of the invention's changes to the prior art from the perspective of a 
skilled artisan. That is, the PT AB inquired as to extent of the gap and likeli-
hood a skilled artisan would have crossed it and made the invention given 
what she knew from the prior art. 
Additionally, the PTAB has also used predictable results-Type II pre-
dictability-as evidence of obviousness. Such was the case in one of the 
PTAB's precedential decisions after KSR, Ex Parte Smith. 162 In Smith, the 
PTAB focused on the predictability of the invention's operation-its results. 
The PT AB examined the nonobviousness of "a pocket insert for a bound 
book, which includes at least one pocket adapted to receive and retain sup-
plemental material that cannot easily be bound directly to the book binding, 
such as a diskette or CD-ROM." 163 The PTAB considered whether it was 
obvious to improve a pocket insert by creating two pockets from a single 
pocket by using an additional line of adhesive. 164 
While finding some reasons to combine, the Board went out of its way 
to note that: 
Appellant's claims [] were combinations which only unite old ele-
ments with no change in their respective functions and which yield 
predictable results. Thus, the claimed subject matter likely would 
have been obvious under KSR. In addition, neither Appellant's 
Specification nor Appellant's arguments present any evidence that 
156. Ex Parte Tzong in Yeh Appellant, No. 2010-009006, 2010 WL 5132689 (B.P.A.I. 
Dec. 14, 2010). 
157. Id. at *I. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at *2. 
160. Id. at *IO. 
161. Id. 
162. 83 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1509 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (precedential). 
163. Id. at 1510-11. 
164. Id. at 1513-14. 
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the modifications necessary to effect the combination are uniquely 
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art. Because 
this is a case where the improvement is no more than "the simple 
substitution of one known element for another or the mere applica-
tion of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for improve-
ment," KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1740, 82 USPQ2d at 1396, no further 
analysis was required by the Examiner. 165 
415 
Under this analysis, the focus was not on whether there was any likeli-
hood that a skilled artisan would have come up with the combination. In-
stead, the analysis focuses on whether, once given the idea to make the 
combination, a skilled artisan could actually have constructed it and pre-
dicted what it would have done. Thus, Smith relies on Type II predictability 
in finding the invention obvious. 166 
2. Federal Courts' Use of Predictability After KSR 
Federal courts also make nonobviousness determinations, which typi-
cally occur in two situations: patent infringement litigation, where the paten-
tee is accusing someone of practicing the claimed invention, or appeals from 
the USPTO, where a patent applicant, or third party, is challenging the 
USPTO' s determination as to nonobviousness. 167 
Accordingly, this Part examines decisions by both the Federal Circuit 
and district courts to determine how they apply the predictability discussion 
in KSR. Notably, both courts apply the two types of predictability to decide 
nonobviousness. And, most apparent at the district court level, there is disa-
greement as to whether Type II predictability is a viable standard for deter-
mining nonobviousness. District courts also explicitly discuss how Type II 
predictability changes the fundamentals of the nonobviousness standard. 
a. Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit employs both types of predictability in its nonobvi-
ousness opinions after KSR. Most notably, the court has used Type II pre-
dictability to invalidate a patent. 
i. Type I Cases 
The Federal Circuit relied on Type I predictability in its recent nonobvi-
ousness decisions. Unsurprisingly, Type I predictability continues to play a 
significant role in Federal Circuit nonobviousness decision-making. Below 
is sampling of such decisions. 
165. Id. at 1518. 
166. Id. at 1518-19. 
167. 35 u.s.c. § 282 (2012). 
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The Federal Circuit's decision in Wyers v. Master Lock Co. provides a 
good example of Type I predictability .168 The patent at issue in Wyers cov-
ered a trailer hitch pin used to secure the trailer to the car's hitch. 169 The 
patent claimed a hitch pin with a lock on one end, to prevent theft, and 
removable sleeves, to make the pin fit different hitches, making the pin 
adaptable. 170 The prior art disclosed lockable hitch pins and also disclosed 
the use of sleeves to better connect trailers to hitches, but did not disclose 
both in the same piece of prior art. 171 
Citing KSR, the Federal Circuit concluded "that the invention [] repre-
sents no more than 'the predictable use of prior art elements according to 
their established functions,'" and found the invention obvious. 172 This Type 
I predictability inquiry asked whether a skilled artisan would have expected 
to solve the known problem of needing an adaptable hitch pin that was also 
lockable by combining the prior art. 173 The court concluded such a reasona-
ble expectation existed that, when added to the common sense of the skilled 
artisan, rendered the combination predictable and, therefore, obvious. 174 
A similar Type I analysis occurred in Ball Aerosol & Specialty 
Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands as part of the court's analysis on the motiva-
tion to combine. 175 In Ball Aerosol, the patent claimed a candle tin where the 
removable cover also acted as a base to the candle that, by having raised 
feet, prevented the candle from scorching the surface it was sitting on. 176 
The prior art knew of this problem and disclosed candleholders that had 
feet. 177 The prior art also disclosed removable covers that could be used as 
bases, although these covers did not have feet. 178 These two types of art had 
never been combined before the invention. 
The court concluded that combining these two was a "predictable varia-
tion" of the prior art and thus obvious. 179 Just as in Wyeth, the court relied on 
the Type I predictability set forth in KSR. 180 It was well known in the prior 
art that feet helped prevent scorching and using a candle's cover as bases 
was also prevalent. 181 Combining these two was a predictable step for a 
skilled artisan. Put another way, the variation was something a skilled artisan 
168. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
169. Id. at 1233-34. 
170. Id. at 1234-36. 
171. Id. at 1237-38. 
172. Id. at 1245. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1245-47. 
175. Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
176. Id. at 987-88. 
177. Id. at 988. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 992-93. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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was likely to try and thus obvious. 182 Accordingly, "the combination would 
have been entirely predictable and grounded in common sense." 183 
ii. Type II Cases 
Importantly, the Federal Circuit has also invoked Type II predictability 
in its decisions. In at least one case, Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., Type II 
predictability was one of multiple rationales supporting a finding of obvi-
ousness in a single case. 184 The patent in Ecolab claimed a combination of 
antibacterial chemicals in a single sanitizer for beef and poultry process-
ing.185 One of the claims at issues required application of this sanitizer to 
take place under a specific spray pressure. 186 The prior art disclosed "rapidly 
spraying" the same chemical combination on beef and poultry, but did not 
discuss at what pressure. 187 Other prior art that did not disclose the same 
antibacterial solution did disclose spraying at a pressure range including the 
patentee's claimed pressure. 188 
The Federal Circuit found the invention obvious because there were 
both reasons to combine these two pieces of prior art and evidence of the 
combination's predictable results.1 89 There were reasons for a skilled artisan 
to try the specific spray pressure method with other antibacterial combina-
tions, including the one claimed in the patent at issue, 190 and a skilled artisan 
would have known to make the patented combination. 191 However, the court 
pointed out that the combination would "yield predictable results," and this 
further supported a conclusion of obviousness. 192 Thus, Type II predictabil-
ity played a role, but not the sole role, in rendering the claims obvious. 193 
182. Id. at 991-92 (noting the Supreme Court's statement in KSR recognition of an "obvi-
ous to try" analysis). 
183. Id. at 993. 
184. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
185. Id. at 1340-41. 
186. Id. at 1349. 
187. Id. at 1349-50. 
188. Id. at 1348-49. 
189. Id. at 1350. 
190. Id. at 1349-50. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. This usage of both Type I and Type II predictability, together, to prove obvi-
ousness also occurred in In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., where the court used evidence of 
predictable results to rebut an argument that a certain prior art taught a skilled artisan away 
from combining the prior art. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) ("As Icon recognizes, Teague instructs that single-action springs provide exactly 
that result. Indeed, '[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is 
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.' [KSR Int'! Inc. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1739]. Accordingly, Teague does not teach away from using 
single-action springs in Icon's invention·."). Predictable results provided a reason for a skilled 
artisan to combine the prior art, not be discouraged from combining it. Id. at 1381-82. And in 
In re Schwemberger, in addition to relying on evidence of "predictable use," the court empha-
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More significantly, the Federal Circuit has relied solely on Type II pre-
dictability to hold an invention obvious. The court's decision in Agrizap, 
Inc. v. Woodstream Corp. is such a case. 194 Agrizap involved a patent claim-
ing a pest control device that uses the pest's contact with a resistive switch 
to complete an electric circuit and trigger a high voltage shock to "send the 
pest towards its demise." 195 The prior art was the "Gopher Zapper" that used 
a mechanical pressure-switch that, when physically pressed by a gopher, 
would complete the circuit and generate an electrical charge. 196 The differ-
ence between the prior art and the invention was "the type of switch used to 
complete the circuit that triggers the generator."197 Other prior art such as a 
cattle prod-although not a pest control device-used an animal's body as a 
resistive switch to complete a circuit for the generation of an electric 
charge. 198 
The Agrizap court viewed these facts as "a textbook case of when the 
asserted claims involve a combination of familiar elements according to 
known methods that does no more than yield predictable results." 199 The 
court quoted KSR 's recitation of "predictable results" as a basis for obvi-
ousness200 and concluded that combining the Gopher Zapper and a cattle 
prod would create a product that would perform like the invention, and this 
performance is predictable.201 
The Federal Circuit has also relied on Type II predictability to affirm 
USPTO rejections of patent applications as obvious.202 In In re Clark, the 
court concluded that an application covering the transmitting of therapeutic 
electromagnetic signals to an area of the human body was obvious, because 
"[i]n total, the evidence shows that equipping the LISTEN system disclosed 
in the LISTEN manual with an FM transmitter in 1998 involved the combi-
nation of familiar elements according to known methods and would yield 
predictable results."203 A similar reliance on Type II predictability occurred 
in In re Lackey, with the court concluding that "[i]n this case, the claimed 
invention may be obtained merely by making Ericson's valve out of either 
sized that combining two of the prior art surgical instruments "is no more than 'the combina-
tion of familiar elements according to known methods ... [with] predictable results.' ... 
Therefore, the Board correctly determined that claim 9 is obvious over the combination of [the 
prior art]." In re Schwemberger, 410 Fed. Appx. 298, 303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
194. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
195. Id. at 1339-40. 
196. Id. at 1343-44. 
197. Id. at 1344. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1343-44. 
201. Id. 
202. Perhaps with the underlying USPTO decisions driven by the MPEP's heavy reliance 
on Type II predictability as a sole basis for obviousness, the Federal Circuit in tum simply 
relied on this rationale as well when deciding these appeals from these examiner decisions. 
203. In re Clark, 420 Fed. Appx. 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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copper, black steel or cast iron as taught by Kohn. This is simply the substi-
tution of one known material for a generic metal to obtain predictable 
res u Its. "204 
Thus, the Federal Circuit has clearly used both types of predictability in 
its decisions after KSR. And, in cases such as Agrizap, In re Clark and In re 
Lackey, the court appears willing to rely solely on Type II predictability to 
hold a claim obvious. 
b. District Courts 
Just like the Federal Circuit, district courts have used both types of pre-
dictability. Some district courts have even explicitly distinguished between 
the two types of predictability KSR introduced into the nonobviousness anal-
ysis. Some of these district courts have subsequently rejected using Type II 
predictability, because it deviates from the fundamental underpinnings of 
nonobviousness doctrine.205 
i. Type I Cases 
District courts after KSR have used Type I predictability-determining 
whether the inventor's use of prior art elements was predictable. The deci-
sion by then-district court judge (now Federal Circuit judge) O'Malley in 
Oatey Co. v. /PS Corp. is a good example of such usage.206 Oatey involved a 
patent on a washing machine's outlet box that included a common 
"tailpiece," which connected the washer's expelled water to the home's 
drainage system, combined with two drain ports. 207 The alleged infringer 
asserted that the patent was obvious in light of prior art that placed the drain 
ports side-by-side and prior art that used a funnel-shaped common tailpiece 
to combine multiple wastewater streams.208 
In analyzing this claim, the district court first articulated the standard for 
nonobviousness, stating that, based on KSR, "a designer is not entitled to 
patent protection for solving an apparent problem by virtue of an apparent 
solution to achieve a predictable result."209 The court concluded that "[t]he 
Supreme Court thus instructed courts to 'ask whether the improvement is 
more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their estab-
lished functions[.]' "210 The court noted that "[a]lthough the court quoted the 
204. In re Lackey, 371 Fed. Appx. 80, 82 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
205. See, e.g., Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 
162, 170 (D. Mass. 2007), a.ff d in part, rev 'd in part, and remanded on other grounds, 567 
F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a jury instruction based on predictability of results as a 
sole basis for a finding of obviousness). 
206. Oatey Co. v. !PS Corp., 665 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
207. Id. at 836-38. 
208. Id. at 865. 
209. Id. at 843. 
2 IO. Id. at 843-44. 
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phrase 'predictable results,"' the phrase "was [used] in the context of the 
ultimate question of whether a skilled artisan would find the inventor's solu-
tion itself "predictable."211 Thus, it appears the court's view of "results" is 
the modification and combination of the prior art, not the operation of the 
ultimate invention. 
One district court went a step further: not only did it adopt Type I pre-
dictability, the court explicitly rejected Type II predictability. In Hynix Semi-
conductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., the district court rejected Type II 
predictability as the sole basis for an obviousness finding. 212 In Hynix, the 
alleged infringer "argue[d] that KSR requires the court to instruct the jury 
that a 'combination of familiar elements according to known methods is 
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.' "213 
The district court refused to issue this instruction, concluding that, at best, 
this statement by the KSR Court simply reinstated the synergy line of 
cases-that "easily-made combination of familiar elements must generate 
some synergy to be non-obvious."214 In the district court's eyes, the only 
change from KSR was the rejection of a rigid approach to determining 
whether there is a reason to combine. The court concluded that KSR did not 
introduce a new, Type II predictability standard for determining 
nonobviousness.215 
Another lower court decision, in Depuy Spine v. Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek, Inc., noted that Type I predictability is the main focus of the nonob-
viousness analysis.216 In Depuy Spine, the alleged infringer specifically ar-
gued that, under KSR, "predictability of success is the sole criterion of the 
obviousness inquiry and that it is irrelevant whether a person would be moti-
vated to make the proposed combination in the first place."217 The defendant 
cited the Court's discussion in KSR of Adams and Sakraida to support this 
conclusion.218 The district court rejected this notion that predictable results, 
by themselves, can render a patent claim obvious.219 Instead, the court con-
cluded that Type II predictability could be a factor, but, under KSR, "identi-
fying the reason for combining prior art references in the first place remains 
'important.' "220 To put this statement in the context of nonobviousness the-
211. Id. 
212. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2009 WL 
112834 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2009). 
213. Id. at *17 (quoting KSR lnt'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1739). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170 (D. 
Mass. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded on other grounds, 567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 170-71. 
219. Id. at 171. 
220. Id. 
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ory-the court concluded that measuring the gap is the main focus of the 
nonobviousness analysis, not measuring the results of the invention by 
themselves. 
ii. Type II Cases 
In sharp contrast to these cases, other district courts have, in relying on 
language in KSR, affirmatively adopted Type II predictability as a nonobvi-
ousness test. 
In Board of Trustees Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
Inc., the district court cited with approval the USPTO's MPEP rationales for 
finding obviousness under KSR, including those that rely solely on predict-
able results to establish obviousness.221 
The district court in Church & Dwight Co. v. Abbott Labs. went a step 
further and instructed the jury on Type II predictability.222 The court told the 
jury that "[i]f the claimed invention combined elements known in the prior 
art and the combination yielded results that were predictable to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, then this evidence would 
make it more likely that the claim was obvious."223 These courts come to the 
opposite conclusion of Depuy and Hynix, finding that Type II predictability 
can prove that an invention is obvious. 
Moreover, district courts have even invalidated patents based on mere 
evidence of Type II predictability. In Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, 
lnc. 224 the patent-in-suit claimed a sensor for an alarm system where the 
sensor cord, attached to the valuable item being monitored, was retracta-
ble.225 The invention allowed the user of the item to move the item into a 
comfortable position while the sensor was still attached.226 Two pieces of 
prior art were at issue: an alarm system with a fixed-length sensor cord,227 
and a retractable telephone cord device.228 
The court in Se-Kure concluded that the invention was obvious because, 
when the prior art was combined, the result was predictable. 229 The court 
noted that "[t]elling, plaintiff does not contest the fact that the additional of a 
retractable telephone cord device ... to the [fixed-length alarm system] 
would have produced a predictable result. Ultimately, '[t]he combination of 
221. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 
F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1037-38 (N.D. Cal. 2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds by 583 
F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
222. Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-2142 (GEB)(JJH), 2008 WL 
2566193 (D.N.J. June 24, 2008). 
223. Id. at *7. 
224. 662 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
225. Id. at 1009. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 1013-14. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 1016-17. 
422 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:391 
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when 
it does no more than yield predictable results.' "230 "[T]he ultimate result" of 
combining the prior art "was expected and predictable."231 Notably, this 
analysis does not focus on the likelihood the two pieces of prior art would be 
combined, but on whether their combination would work in a manner that 
was expected by skilled artisan. This is the Type II predictability analysis 
introduced by KSR-predictability of results. 
A similar nonobviousness analysis focused on Type II predictability oc-
curred in Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. Balboa Mfg. Co. 232 The pat-
ent at issue claimed a mask that could be worn on a person's mouth and nose 
with a scarf portion attached that would be worn around the person's neck. 233 
This invention could keep the person's face warm from the nose down, 
while allowing that person to also wear goggles or other eye protection, and 
a hat.234 The prior art included numerous pieces of head gear, none exactly 
like the invention, but each disclosing at least an aspect of the invention-as 
examples, either a scarf for the neck, or a full ski mask covering the nose 
and mouth.235 The issue was whether the invention was obvious in light of 
each of its individual elements being disclosed in the prior art.236 
The Seirus court concluded that the invention was obvious because the 
individual elements of the mask were well known and the results of their 
combination were predictable.237 As the court noted, "[t]he record shows that 
combining the various elements using known methods, as shown in the prior 
art, would yield predictable results for cold weather head gear."238 Relying 
heavily on KSR, the court simply inquired whether the individual elements 
were well known and whether their combination would "produce[] predict-
able results."239 Since there was no triable issue of fact on these two issues, 
the patent was obvious.240 There was little additional inquiry as to whether 
there would be any reason for a skilled artisan to make such a combina-
tion.241 Like the Se-Kure court, bridging the gap between the prior art and 
the invention was not the focus of the inquiry. Instead, the inquiry focused 
on the result of combining the individual elements of the invention together 
and whether this result was predictable. 
230. Id. at 1016-17. 
231. Id. at 1017. 
232. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. v. Balboa Mfg. Co., No. 09-CV-2274, 2012 
WL 423760 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2012). 
233. Id. at *I. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at *4-5. 
236. Id. at *5. 
237. Id. at *6. 
238. Id. at *5. 
239. Id. at *6. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at *6-7. 
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Thus, district courts disagree as to whether Type II predictability alone 
can form the basis of an obviousness conclusion after KSR. In contrast to the 
Federal Circuit, district courts clearly recognize the two kinds of predictabil-
ity introduced in KSR. The dispute among the district courts is then whether 
there truly is a distinct, Type II predictability test for nonobviousness. Some 
district courts see Type II predictability as just another articulation of Type I 
predictability-predictability as to use of the prior art, and thus a reason to 
combine or change the prior art. Others view Type II predictability as simi-
lar to synergy and thus not focused on predictability as much as a new or 
greater result from a given combination. And, finally, some district courts 
recognize Type II predictability as its own, independent nonobviousness 
test-allowing the predictable operation of the invention alone to form the 
basis for an invention's invalidity. 242 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF USING TYPE II PREDICTABILITY 
AS A NoNOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD 
The USPTO and some federal courts, including the Federal Circuit, 
clearly use Type II predictability in determining nonobviousness after KSR. 
Notably, this type of predictability has even formed the sole basis for render-
ing an invention obvious on more than one occasion after KSR.243 
What makes this usage of Type II predictability so significant is that the 
standard introduces a new, and very different, substantive approach to non-
obviousness. 244 Whether the results of a combination or change to the prior 
242. These courts using Type II predictability could have come to the same conclusion 
under Type I predictability. However, as explained in more detail infra, Type II predictability 
favors the patentability of some technologies over others, see infra Part 111.C, and also runs 
counter to basic patent policy, see infra Part 111.D. 
243. See supra notes 194-220, 224-41 (collecting such cases). 
244. Interestingly, most commentators have focused on other parts of KSR, not its intro-
duction of Type II predictability. See, e.g., Timothy J. Le Due, Apples are Not Common Sense 
in View of Oranges: Time to Reform KSR's Illusory Obviousness Standard?, 21 DEPAUL J. 
ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (2010) (critiquing KSR's flexible standard for obvi-
ousness); Timothy J. Le Due, The Role of Market Incentives in KSR's Obviousness Inquiry, 11 
WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & lNTELL. PROP. L. 33 (2010) (discussing KSR's market and design 
forces rationale under the flexible nonobviousness approach); Gregory N. Mandel, Another 
Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court's Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat 
Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEw1s & CLARK L. REv. 323, 324 (2008) (concluding 
that KSR "still [did] not define[] what the standard actually requires"); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237 (2008) (explaining how KSR brings the 
skilled artisan to the forefront in the nonobviousness analysis). 
Commentators have discussed the number of analytical tools available when applying the 
fourth step under Graham and whether this has substantively changed the nonobviousness 
standard. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 4, at 991-92 (arguing that nonobviousness 
after KSR "should be reconceived as a truly realistic inquiry, one that focuses on what the 
PH OS IT A and the marketplace actually know and believe, not what they might believe in a 
hypothetical, counterfactual world"); Fromer, supra note 4, at 77 (suggesting that the Court's 
approach in KSR should focus on "the correct object to be analyzed for obviousness ... the 
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art are predictable focuses not on whether there was a reason to make the 
change to the prior art in the first place. Nor does Type II predictability care 
whether the change has synergy by producing something that is greater than 
the original, prior art parts. Instead, when asking whether the results of an 
invention are predictable, the USPTO and courts assume the combination or 
change as given and then turn to whether the invention works as a skilled 
artisan would think it would work. This approach shifts the substantive 
question from the difference between the prior art and the invention-the 
gap-to an inquiry solely focused on the invention and how it operates. 
As a nonobviousness test, Type II predictability not only substantively 
changes the law, it also introduces a number of disadvantages into the patent 
system. First, the change violates the plain language of Section 103 and the 
statutorily-mandated focus on the difference between the prior art and the 
invention instead of the result itself. Second, the change also increases the 
likelihood of hindsight bias because the perspective of the skilled artisan is 
changed from being prospective to being retrospective. This in turn increases 
the likelihood of errors in nonobviousness determinations. Third, Type II 
predictability also biases patent protection against simple and predictable 
technologies and can result in unwarranted protection of unpredictable tech-
nologies. All of these disadvantages create a nonobviousness standard that is 
contrary to patent theory, because this standard focuses on the technological 
accomplishments of the result, not the risks of journeying down a develop-
ment path that an ordinary skilled artisan would not have taken. 
A. Type I/ Predictability Violates Section 103's Statutory Requirements 
Section 103 of the Patent Act sets forth the conditions for finding an 
invention obvious.245 The statute requires a finding of obviousness "if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 
union of two different aspects of invention important to patent law: (I) the concept of the 
invention; and (2) the reduction to practice of a working model"); Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cos/-
Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 39 (2008) (articulating a cost-
benefit approach allows patentability to be an objective, empirical question). 
Some have gone further to determine whether KSR's introduction of flexibility has 
heightening or lowering the nonobviousness standard. See, e.g., Lunney, Jr. & Johnson, supra 
note 4 (finding that KSR has not restored the strength of the nonobviousness requirement to 
"its former self' before the creation of the Federal Circuit); Michelle Friedman Murray, Non-
obviousness Standards for Hardware and Software Before and After KSR: What is the Differ-
ence?, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 259 (2011) (examining a handful of Federal 
Circuit cases and concluding that KSR raised the skill of the art in the software arts to the same 
level as in hardware). 
245. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The AIA changed the definition of prior art, with the rele-
vant timeframe being prior to filing instead of prior to invention, but the operative statutory 
test for nonobviousness stays the same. 
Spring 2014] Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law 425 
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which said subject matter pertains."246 
The statute thus focuses the inquiry on the "differences" between the 
invention and the prior art.247 The statute requires that the determination of 
whether this difference is obvious be made through the eyes of a "person 
having ordinary skill in the art" "at the time of the invention."248 
These plain language requirements of Section 103 are reiterated in the 
first Supreme Court opinion to interpret the statute-Graham. The Graham 
Court noted that the "first sentence of this section," Section 103, "place[s] 
emphasis on the pertinent ar[t] [sic] existing at the time the invention was 
made and both are implicitly tied to advances in that art."249 The statute 
focuses on the perspective at the time of the invention's creation and looks at 
the distance, the amount of change, to travel from the prior art to the inven-
tion.250 The Court explained that Section 103 sets the "emphasis on non-
obviousness [as] one of inquiry, not quality."251 This discussion dismissed 
any thought that nonobviousness focuses on testing the quality of the inven-
tion-the result of changes to the prior art-by itself. Instead, per this dis-
cussion, the nonobviousness analysis should be an inquiry into the distance 
crossed to get there. 252 
In Graham, the Court articulated the factors that further emphasize mea-
suring this difference to determine an invention's nonobviousness, based on 
the Court's interpretation of the then newly-minted Section 103.253 These 
factors focus on first defining the gap, then defining the individual through 
whom the gap is judged, and, finally determining, "[a]gainst this back-
ground, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is deter-
mined."254 The factors reinforce Section 103's focus-on the gap between 
the prior art and the invention and the ease and likelihood, or lack thereof, 
by which a skilled artisan could have crossed this gap at the time the inven-
tion was created.255 
Accordingly, a Type II predictability standard that looks at predictable 
results violates that plain language of Section 103 and the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the statute in Graham. Asking whether an invention pro-
246. Id. 
247. See supra Part I.A. 
248. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). That is, obviousness is determined from the perspective of 
a skilled artisan standing at the beginning of the gap-at the time of the invention. See Co-
tropia, supra note 36, at 24-25. 
249. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 14 (1966). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See Cotropia, supra note 36, at 27-29 (explaining how Graham establishes a "gap 
measuring" test for nonobviousness). 
253. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
254. Id. 
255. See Cotropia, supra note 36, at 27-29 
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vides predictable results ignores any differences between the prior art and 
the invention. Instead, predictability of the results looks at the invention it-
self.256 Type II predictability also shifts the perspective of the nonobvious-
ness test away from a forward-looking inquiry into the differences present at 
the time of the invention to a retrospective one, by taking the invention as a 
given and then asking about properties of the invention's components and 
how they operate together.257 Both of these aspects of Type II predictabil-
ity-focusing on the invention itself, not the gap, and the retrospective per-
spective258-run counter to the plain language of Section 103. 
One could argue that the predictability of an invention's results provides 
some insight into the likelihood the combination would happen in the first 
place. As the Federal Circuit in DePuy Spine explained, predictability of 
both the use of the prior art as well as the results once combined can speak 
to the invention's obviousness.259 Predictable results could have second-or-
der implications as to the extent of the difference, on which Section 103 
focuses. 
There is no real linkage between Type II predictability and Section 
103's gap, however. Predictability of the operability of an invention's indi-
vidual elements has no real bearing on whether they will ever be put together 
in the first place. Skilled artisans are sometimes motivated to combine ele-
ments when their predictive interactions are unknown or, at the very least, 
unpredictable.260 This happens routinely in a variety of technologies.261 And 
skilled artisans are also known to not attempt to put two elements together 
even though they would know what the result would be.262 This situation-
where the inventor actions are needed to create the invention in the first 
instance, even though the results produced by the invention are predict-
able-is also commonplace in a variety of technologies.263 Accordingly, al-
though there could be a second-order linkage, other evidence is needed to 
see if the difference truly is nonobvious, as defined by Section 103. And 
this other evidence-in the form of some reason to combine or change the 
256. See supra Part 11.B. 
257. See supra Part Il.B. 
258. See supra Part II.B. 
259. See Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc, 526 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170-
71 (D. Mass. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded on other grounds, 567 F.3d 
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
260. See supra note 104 (detailing the common usage of the uncertainty principle in 
applied physics). 
261. Id. 
262. See supra notes 108-111 (detailing such simple inventions such as liquid paper and 
Post-It Notes, where the results are highly predictable once the combination is known, but 
there was no motivation for anyone to make the inventions in the first instance-the inventor's 
insight was needed). 
263. See supra notes 108-111. 
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prior art-is the type of evidence the statute, Section 103, and Graham re-
quire in order to find an invention obvious.264 
B. Type II Predictability Makes the Analysis More 
Susceptible to Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight bias is the inclination to see outcomes that have already oc-
curred as being more likely than they actually were before they took place.265 
The observed outcome influences the decision-maker's conclusion as to how 
the question would have been answered, because the tendency is for the 
answer to mimic the actual outcome observed.266 A classic hindsight bias is 
the "Monday morning quarterback" scenario, in which a decision-maker 
concludes that a pass should have not been thrown, based not on the infor-
mation available at the time the pass was made, but on the results-say an 
interception or incompletion-of that pass.267 
The change in perspective introduced by Type II predictability corre-
spondingly introduces additional hindsight bias into the nonobviousness 
analysis. The nonobviousness inquiry is already susceptible to hindsight bias 
because the inquiry asks whether the invention was obvious at the time of 
the invention, which is a period of time necessarily in the past.268 Moreover, 
this question is asked with the outcome (the invention) already in front of the 
decision-maker. 269 A Type II predictability analysis adds to this hindsight 
bias by shifting the timeframe of the nonobviousness question from just 
before the invention's creation to just after.270 This increased hindsight bias 
further prejudices the decision-maker towards the invention's 
obviousness. 271 
264. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (noting the importance 
in finding a reason to combine); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 14 (1966). 
265. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 Omo ST. L.J. 1391, 1400-01 (2006). 
266. Id. at 1401-02. 
267. Id. at I 394 ("The hindsight bias is recognized in common wisdom: 'hindsight is 20/ 
20,' and being a 'Monday morning quarterback' exaggerates one's foresight."). 
268. See generally Mandel, supra note 265; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious 
JI: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Bias Issue before the Supreme Court in KSR v. 
Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. I (2007) (discussing hindsight bias in patent law). 
269. See Mandel, supra note 265, at 1399-1400 ("The non-obvious standard of§ 103(a) 
requires the decision-maker to make an historical judgment: whether the invention would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made in the past. To reach a proper non-obvious 
conclusion, the decision-maker must step backward in time to a moment when the invention 
was unknown."). 
270. See supra Part II.B. 
271. See Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobvi-
ou.mess Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 57, 95-96 (2008) 
(noting that hindsight "bias unconsciously and inevitably distorts judgment of the obviousness 
of an invention, making inventions appear more obvious ex post than they actually were ex 
ante."). 
428 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:391 
Section 103 and the Graham factors try to fight hindsight bias in two 
ways. Under the typical Graham approach under Section 103, the decision-
maker must at least find a reason for the skilled artisan to cross the differ-
ence between the prior art and the invention.272 This decision-maker is 
forced to answer this question through the lens of someone who does not yet 
know about the inventor's creation.273 Certainly hindsight bias might make 
finding this reason easier, but there must still be a reason articulated to sup-
port a finding of obviousness.274 Moreover, the reason must be found in the 
universe as it existed prior to the invention's creation.275 Although not fool-
proof, these two parts of the pre-KSR analysis-by definition-force the 
decision-maker to not rely solely on outcome information.276 The decision-
maker cannot use the invention alone to prove its obviousness.277 
Type II predictability can exacerbate the hindsight problem by focusing 
the nonobviousness inquiry almost solely on the outcome-the invention-
while also moving the inquiry away from the difference-the gap-that 
must be overcome to achieve the invention.278 If Type II predictability is 
enough to establish obviousness, the analysis is then focused exclusively on 
the outcome and whether it was predictable.279 This determination is made 
with the invention squarely before the decision-maker and nothing else.280 
The decision-maker does not need to question the circumstances surrounding 
the invention's creation. The only inquiry is whether the invention's ele-
ments act predictably after they are combined. Thus, the parts of the Section 
103 and Graham analysis that mitigate hindsight bias are removed, making 
272. See KSR Jnt'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (noting the importance 
in finding a reason to combine); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 14 (1966); In re 
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Our case law makes clear that the best 
defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is 
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine 
prior art references."). 
273. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
("Yet the attribution of a compound as a lead compound after the fact must avoid hindsight 
bias; it must look at the state of the art at the time the invention was made to find a motivation 
to select and then modify a lead compound to arrive at the claimed invention."). 
274. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting the need for reasons, not merely conclusions, to establish obviousness 
in order to remove hindsight bias). 
275. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
("The first requirement, the motivation to combine references, serves to prevent hindsight 
bias."). 
276. See Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc. 632 F.3d 1358, 1378 (Fed Cir. 2011) ("It is 
improper to take concepts from other devices and change them in light of the now-known 
template of the patented device, without some direction in the prior art that would render it 
obvious to do so."). 
277. Id. 
278. See supra Part 11.A.2. 
279. See supra Part 11.A.2. 
280. See supra Part 11.A.2; see also supra Part 11.B. 
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such bias more likely to occur.281 There does not need to be evidence as to 
why a skilled artisan would have created the invention, nor whether this 
reason to combine or change the prior art was present before the invention's 
actual creation. 
One could point to an additional barrier to hindsight bias present even 
with Type II predictability-secondary considerations indicating that an in-
vention is nonobvious. These secondary considerations, also referred to as 
objective factors, can rebut a prima facie finding of obviousness. 282 As the 
Supreme Court has noted, one purpose of these considerations is to "serve to 
'guard against slipping into use of hindsight,' and to resist the temptation to 
read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue."283 Such con-
siderations are meant, in part, to make the "factfinder ... aware, of course, 
of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments 
reliant upon ex post reasoning."284 
But, by shifting the focus to the invention itself, a Type II predictability 
standard removes the typical front-line defense to hindsight bias-the re-
quirement for a reason to create the invention in the first place. Type II 
predictability side steps this forward-looking inquiry that works with secon-
dary considerations to counteract hindsight bias. Furthermore, courts and 
scholars have documented the failure of secondary considerations to over-
come a prima facie case of obviousness in most cases. 285 Courts and the 
USPTO rarely change their conclusions in light of objective indicia of non-
obviousness.286 Moreover, the standard being applied to admit such evidence 
of secondary considerations continues to rise, devaluing such information 
281. See supra Part 11.A.2; see also supra Part 11.B. 
282. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 
699 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("This is precisely the sort of hindsight bias that evalua-
tion of objective evidence is intended to avoid."). 
283. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 36 (1966). 
284. Id. at 36 (quoting Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethom Mfg. & Supply Co., 
332 F.2d 406, 412 (1964)) ("They may also serve to 'guard against slipping into use of hind-
sight,' and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in 
issue."). 
285. See Mandel, supra note 265 at 1422 ("Secondary consideration evidence does not 
significantly ameliorate the hindsight problem for two basic reasons: it is often not available, 
and even when it is available, it is not particularly probative of whether an invention was non-
obvious."). 
286. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 929 (2007) (finding the 
irrelevance of secondary considerations in most nonobviousness analysis); John Paul Putney, 
Are Secondary Considerations Still "Secondary"?: An Examination of Objective Jndicia of 
Nonobviousness Five Years After KSR, 4 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 45, 59 (2012) ("Al-
though very recent cases hint at room for change, that clear pattern following KSR sees a rather 
'unpersuasive' role for objective indicia."). 
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further in the nonobviousness analysis.287 Accordingly, the Graham factors, 
and the focus on the difference between the prior art and the invention, play 
an ever-increasing role in reducing hindsight bias. Type II predictability 
removes these checks against such bias and, thus, is more likely to introduce 
additional bias into the analysis. 
C. Type II Predictability Introduces Bias Against 
Simple and Predictable Technologies 
Focusing on Type II predictability also biases patent protection against 
simple and predictable technologies. By definition, the operation and inter-
action of these technologies is easy to predict. Therefore, if the test for non-
obviousness is whether an invention has predictable results, then 
uncomplicated technologies are unlikely to be deemed nonobvious and 
therefore unlikely to receive patent protection. The simpler the technology, 
the easier it is for a skilled artisan to predict how it will behave. Under the 
reasoning underlying Type II predictability, patent applications and issued 
patents covering these technologies will fare poorly both at the USPTO and 
courts and are more likely to be found obvious. 
Mechanical, electrical, and computer software technologies are com-
monly considered to be predictable technologies, while chemical and biolog-
ical ones are not.288 The way mechanical elements interact is generally easy 
to predict, as the basics of mechanics are well understood and docu-
mented. 289 The same is true of electrical devices and computer software, 
especially in the digital, binary-based technology space.290 And, perhaps 
most importantly, these conclusions regarding predictable behavior are al-
ready embedded in patent case law, where courts have routinely found these 
287. See, e.g., Western Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 
1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (placing the burden on the patentee to proof a nexus between secon-
dary considerations and the invention). 
288. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156-57 (2002) ('This implication is closely tied to the Federal 
Circuit's designation of some technologies as belonging to the 'unpredictable arts'; the court 
treats biotechnology as if the results obtained in that art are somehow outside the control of 
those of skill in the art, whereas computer science is treated as if those of skill in the art have 
their outcomes well in hand."); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredict-
able Arts, 56 UCLA L. REv. 127, 136-39 (2008) (setting forth these commonly thought of 
predictable and unpredictable technology areas). One notable exception is the use of quantum 
mechanics in these technological fields. See supra note 104. 
289. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that mechanical and 
electrical inventions behave predictably). Again, a notable exception is the use of quantum 
mechanics in these technological fields. See supra note I 04. 
290. See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 943 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
("The great weight of the expert testimony on both sides was that a programmer of reasonable 
skill could write a satisfactory program with ordinary effort. This requires the conclusion that 
the programs here involved were, to a skilled programmer, routine."). 
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technologies to behave predictably.291 In contrast, chemical and biology-
based technologies are generally considered unpredictable. 292 Specifically, 
the interactions between various chemicals or biological elements are more 
likely to behave unpredictably.293 Regardless of the actual truth of these pro-
positions, courts commonly come to these blanket conclusions when decid-
ing patent issues in these technological spaces.294 
Accordingly, Type II predictability standards make it harder to find 
mechanical, electrical, and computer software inventions nonobvious. If 
courts consider these inventions to be predictable, these areas would receive 
less patent protection under a predictable results standard. In contrast, chem-
ical and biological inventions would be more likely to get a free pass.295 
Not surprisingly, decisions involving patents in the mechanical and elec-
trical arts often invalidate the patents as obvious under Type II predictabil-
ity.296 Moreover, when predictability establishes obviousness in the chemical 
or biological space, the courts are applying a Type I predictability 
analysis. 297 
This bias against simple and predictable technologies is detrimental. 
The bias introduced by KSR's Type II predictability standard discourages 
beneficial technologies. The standard also causes patent law to be industry-
biased, which runs counter to current patent law principles. These impacts of 
Type II predictability are detailed below. 
First, one of the purposes of patent law is to incentivize the production 
and distribution of technologies society finds valuable,298 and simple tech-
291. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 288, at I 156 (observing that due to the presumption 
of predictable behavior, "[t]he Federal Circuit has essentially excused software inventions 
from compliance with the enablement and best mode requirements."). 
292. See Mycogen Plant Sci. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(calling the chemistry and biology "unpredictable arts"); Karen S. Canady, The Wright Ena-
bling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (1994) (explaining 
the assumed, unpredictable nature of biotechnology in patent law). 
293. See, e.g., In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that chemistry is a 
"less predictable field[ ] ... where minor changes in a product or process may yield substan-
tially different results"). 
294. See Seymore, supra note 288, at 136-39. 
295. The Federal Circuit has even recognized this fact. See Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy's 
Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("To the extent an art is unpredictable, as the 
chemical arts often are, KSR's focus on these 'identified, predictable solutions' may present a 
difficult hurdle because potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable."). 
296. See, e.g., Agrizap Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (using Type II predictability on mechanical patent); Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam 
USA, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (using Type II predictability on 
electro-mechanical patent). 
297. See, e.g., Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (using Type I predictability on pharmaceutical patent). 
298. See Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the Invention?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1855, 1892-95 (describing the basic incentive to invent theory of patent law). 
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nologies can be incredibly valuable to society.299 In fact, simplicity itself can 
be the very reason a technology is valuable. 300 Simple inventions can be the 
most technologically advanced and socially beneficial.301 Patent law, accord-
ingly, should encourage the creation of these simple, socially beneficial 
inventions. 
Second, patent law is meant to be industry and technologically neutral, 
particularly when it comes to the nonobviousness requirement.302 The law 
adapts the nonobviousness standard to the invention's particular technologi-
cal area by using the metric of ordinary skill in the art.303 As such, the opera-
tive nonobviousness standard shifts with the state of the relevant technology, 
and thus should prevent any bias against whole swaths of technologies a 
one-size-fits-all standard would introduce.304 Patent law exists to promote 
advancement in all technological areas, as long as the standards for protec-
tion are met.305 The market is then tasked with sorting out the level of value 
by varying demand for different inventions.306 
Finally, patent law has intended to foster mechanical and electrical in-
ventions and thereby the underlying technology.307 As long as the patentabil-
ity requirements are met, these industries are as much a target of patent 
299. See, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc. 632 F.3d 1358, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (lauding the simplicity of the patented design as one of the inven-
tion's great advantages and rejecting the majority's application of Type II predictability in 
finding the invention obvious). 
300. See, e.g., 1EwKIJS ET AL., supra note 110, at 71 ("Inventors, groping for solutions 
along complicated and expensive roads, have missed the target completely, while an individual 
entering the field with a fresh approach, crude equipment, and a generous smattering of com-
mon sense has achieved success along a path which, in retrospect, looks perfectly simple."); 
JoHN MAEDA, THE LAWS OF SIMPLICITY: DESIGN, TECHNOLOGY, BUSINESS, LIMJ (2006) (not-
ing the value of simplicity in innovations); STEVEN J. PALEY, THE ART OF INVENTION: THE 
CRE/\'IlVE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY AND DESIGN (2010) (same). 
301. Id.; see also Van Veen v. U.S., 386 F.2d 462, 465 (Ct. Cl. 1968) ("Experience has 
shown that some of the simplest advances have been the most nonobvious."). 
302. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B. U. L. 
REv. 51, 100-03 (2010) (noting that by design, the patent system is meant "to apply and 
develop seemingly neutral principles to divergent industries"). 
303. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 288, at 1156 ("[W]hile patent law is technology-
neutral in theory, it is technology-specific in application."). 
304. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1648-51 (2003) ("[B]ecause application of the PHOSITA standard causes nominally 
unitary patent rules to be applied very differently-indeed in directly contradictory ways-in 
different industries, we have included it among the ways in which patent law can accommo-
date the characteristics of particular industries."). 
305. See Sean B. Seymore, Atypical Inventions, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2057, 2058-59 
(2011) ("This framework in theory allows the patent system to adapt flexibly to both old and 
new technologies, encompassing anything under the sun that is made by man." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
306. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 304, at 1576-77, 1580. 
307. See Michael Risch, America's First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1308 (2012) 
(showing in a table that mechanical patents constitute the top twelve historical patent 
classification). 
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policy as the less-predictable arts, such as chemistry and biology. Patent 
protection exists for all of these technical disciplines under the general no-
tion that protection is needed to promote invention. 308 But Type II predict-
ability does not vary protection based on this "but for" criteria.309 Instead, 
Type II predictability creates a higher bar for large swathes of technologies, 
while heavily favoring others, all regardless of the need for incentives. 
D. Type II Predictability Conflicts With Basic Patent Theory 
Type II predictability as a method of determining nonobviousness also 
runs contrary to basic patent theory because patents are intended to incen-
ti vize investments in unknown development paths, not just those inventions 
with unknown results. 310 Traditional patent theory views patents as incen-
tivizing the creation of inventions (the "incentive-to-invent" theory).311 Pat-
ents are the carrots that entice inventors to bridge a gap, from the prior art to 
the invention.312 That is, patents are meant to incentivize inventors to take 
the road less traveled. In contrast, Type II predictability does not focus on 
inventions that are unlikely to be developed, but instead on just those inven-
tions with a particular type of result-an unpredictable one. 
The incentive-to-invent theory is the classic justification for the patent 
system.313 Under this theory, patent law incentivizes the creation of inven-
tions by giving the inventor a mechanism by which she can recoup her de-
velopment costs-exclusivity.314 This theory assumes that the process of 
creating inventions is fraught with costs and uncertainty.315 An inventor will 
not engage in this process unless she knows, if successful, she will be able to 
recoup her costs.316 Patent law gives her this ability via exclusivity over the 
invention.317 Exclusivity allows her to price the invention, once sold, above 
308. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REv. 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to 
invent and create."). 
309. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 20, at 1603-20 (describing the "inducement 
standard" for determining patentability). 
310. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 308. 
311. See MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 6, at 9-12; CRAIG NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 
31 (2d ed. 2011) (detailing the incentive-to-invent theory); Cotropia, supra note 298, at 1892-
95 (setting forth this basic patent theory). Another commonly discussed patent theory, the 
Prospect Theory articulated by Edmund Kitch, is not explored given that Kitch believed, under 
that theory, that there was no need for a nonobviousness requirement. See Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 280-84 (1977). 
312. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 9-12. 
313. See NARD, supra note 311 at 31-32 (detailing the incentive to invent); Cotropia, 
supra note 298, at 1892. 
314. See NARD, supra note 311 at 31-32; Cotropia, supra note 298, at 1892. 
315. See Cotropia, supra note 298, at 1892-95. 
316. Id. 
317. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STun. 247, 247 (1994) (explaining how patent law solves the "appropriability problem"). 
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the mere cost of materials to make or implement the invention and recover 
her development expenditures and tum a profit.318 By facilitating such a re-
covery, patents create a carrot to prompt would-be inventors to take the 
plunge and try to invent something that is patentable.319 
Patents are meant to play a role in the development process. The incen-
tive-to-invent theory makes the process of creating the invention less 
risky.320 This theory is not focused solely on the actual operation and results 
of the invention itself. Instead, it focuses on the path toward conceptualizing 
and creating the invention and the role patent law plays in enticing people to 
proceed down this path, which can be fraught with uncertainty.321 
This patent law theory does not grant protection to only those inventions 
that have a certain outcomes or effects. The value of the resulting invention 
is irrelevant to whether patent protection is needed, as is the commercial 
need for the invention.322 The incentive to invent theory tasks the market, not 
patent law, with making the ultimate determination on the invention's 
value.323 The low utility requirement for patent protection bears this out-
commercial and societal need is not part of the test for patent protection.324 
Patent law instead focuses on getting the invention created, society then does 
the rest to either reward the inventor with high demand or not.325 
The Section 103 and Graham-based nonobviousness test focus on the 
process of inventing, and whether patent protection is needed to incentivize 
this process.326 Nonobviousness is often viewed as implementing a "but for" 
test for patent protection-if the invention would not have been created but 
for the incentive of patent protection, then such protection should be 
318. Id.; Cotropia, supra note 298, at 1892-95. 
319. Cotropia, supra note 298, at 1892-95. 
320. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent 
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 151, 170 (2005) ("The incentive to invent is maintained 
by the would-be inventor's perception that she will get adequate protection to recoup costs."). 
321. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88-96 (2009) (explaining the filing of patent protection to overcome the 
uncertainty surrounding the technological development process). 
322. See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 441 n.49 (4th 
ed. 1988) (indicating that 80-90% of all patents may be without any commercial value); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REv. I, 21 (2005) 
(noting that patents "convey little information about the potential commercial value of the 
invention"); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 355 (2010) 
("First, the patent laws do not require inventions to be in a commercialized form to garner 
protection."). 
323. Sichelman, supra note 322, at 356-60. 
324. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (articulating the test for utility 
as questioning whether the invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end"); Cotropia, 
supra note 321, at 75-76. 
325. See Cotropia, supra note 321, at 82-85 (explaining the commonly understood bene-
fits to early filing as a foundation to commercialization). 
326. See Cotropia, supra note 11. 
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granted. 327 Accordingly, looking to find reasons to combine or change the 
prior art, and therefore cross the gap between the prior art and the invention, 
is an investigation to determine if something more is needed for that devel-
opment path to be taken.328 The traditional rationale behind nonobviousness 
therefore accords with the incentive-to-invent theory. 
But a nonobviousness test that focuses on Type II predictability instead 
of Type I predictability fails to test whether incentives are necessary for the 
development path to be taken: Type II predictability does not ask whether 
society needs help getting to the invention in the first place. Instead, the 
inquiry takes a snapshot at the end of development, at least at the final in-
vention stage, and asks about the resulting invention's behavior.329 
One could argue for the necessity of incentivizing individuals to attempt 
to make inventions that will have unpredictable results. The lack of predict-
ability of the end product makes the path unpredictable as well-or at least 
risky enough that patent protection is necessary to soak up some of that risk. 
Accordingly, an argument could be made that Type II predictability does fit 
in line with classic patent theory's focus on the development path. 
Although this line of reasoning has some viability, evaluating the gap 
directly-as opposed to the result-is more likely to tie patent protection to 
underlying patent theory.330 Patent law is meant to incentivize inventors to 
overcome the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the process of con-
ceptualizing and creating the invention.331 To be sure, the fuzziness of how 
the resulting invention will behave has some bearing on an inventor's deci-
sion to proceed in the first place. This causal linkage is not always the case, 
however,332 and this lack of a link is particularly true when using predictable 
results as evidence of obviousness. The law has, for some time, accepted 
unexpected results as evidence of nonobviousness-good evidence that the 
path is unlikely to be traveled because the end is unpredictable. 333 In con-
trast, predictability of the results, particularly for those in the predictable 
arts, means little or nothing as to whether the skilled artisans will even start 
down the development path.334 For these technologies, there is still the cru-
cial initial decision to even embark on putting the pieces together and mak-
ing the necessary modification to create the invention. This development and 
327. Id.; see also Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 306, at 1599, 1603-20. 
328. Abramowicz and Duffy refer to this general concept as "inducement." Abramowicz 
& Duffy, supra note 309, at 1603-1620. 
329. Id. 
330. The assumption is that patent law should be tied to underlying patent theory. See, 
e.g., Cotropia supra note 298 (evaluating claim interpretation methodology and the disclosure 
requirements in light of patent theory). 
331. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 6, at 2-4 (discussing patent law's push to prompt 
inventors to journey into the uncertain and unknown). 
332. See supra notes I 04-1 11. 
333. See supra notes 101-102. 
334. See supra notes I 04-1 11. 
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creation is what patent law is focused on incentivizing.335 These are the paths 
that are less traveled, not because the end result is unpredictable, but because 
the path itself is difficult to even recognize.336 Type II predictability ignores 
the presence or absence of such recognition by the skilled artisan, while 
patent theory is based upon it. 
Accordingly, the proper test for granting patent protection should be the 
nonobviousness standard articulated in Graham, which asks whether reasons 
to travel down the same path the inventor took existed at the time that the 
invention was made. If such reasons existed-that is there were reasons to 
combine or change the prior art, such as Type I predictability-then patent 
law doesn't need to help incentive the creation of the invention. However, if 
the path has a large enough gap, and a skilled artisan would have been un-
likely to cross the gap, then patent law steps in and entices someone to jump 
the gap and arrive at the invention. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the negative implications of Type II predictability standards, the 
USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and some lower courts should reconsider their 
use of Type II predictability and their interpretation of this part of the KSR 
decision. The simplest solution is for the USPTO and courts to take a narrow 
reading of the "predictable results" language in KSR, and read out any basis 
for Type II predictability. Although the holding in KSR is controlling,337 the 
decision's text, particularly on the concept of predictability, leaves room for 
interpretation. As some courts have already recognized,338 when using the 
phrase "predictable results," the result the Court may have been talking 
about was the creation of the invention itself, not the consequences of the 
invention's operation.339 This interpretation would bring predictable re-
sults-Type II predictability-under the umbrella of Type I predictability 
and in line with the Court's discussion of "predictable solutions."340 This 
interpretation of KSR would also be supported by the fact that, if the Su-
preme Court were trying to so fundamentally change nonobviousness doc-
trine, it would have done so explicitly. At the very least, such an 
interpretation, particularly by the Federal Circuit, would highlight the issues 
335. See supra notes 326-328. 
336. See supra notes 326-328. 
337. However, the Federal Circuit is frequently charged with not following Supreme 
Court precedent. See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. Louis 
U. L.J. 419, 452-53 (2012) ("Not only does the Supreme Court reverse the Federal Circuit 
often, but also its rhetoric toward the Federal Circuit has been described as 'severely critical' 
and 'testy,' 'increasingly disdainful,' and 'harsh,' particularly when it comes to the Federal 
Circuit's failure to follow Supreme Court precedent.") (footnotes omitted). 
338. See supra Part 11.B.2.b.i. 
339. KSR lnt'I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-17 (2007). 
340. Id. at 417 ("[A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predict-
able use of prior art elements according to their established functions."). 
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surrounding Type II predictability and the interpretation of KSR's synergy 
discussion, possibly forcing the Supreme Court to address whether KSR was 
meant to introduce such a massive doctrinal shift in nonobviousness law. 

